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Abstract
This dissertation research contributes to the areas of environmental economics and in-
dustrial organization. In the first essay, I set out to understand firms’ induced innovation
in response to environmental regulation with an emphasis on the temporal decision making
of regulated firms. I find that firms anticipate future increases in environmental stringency
and strive to have patent applications submitted three years prior to the increase in envi-
ronmental stringency. I find evidence that increases in the level of environmental stringency
spur GHG-related innovations. In my second essay, I use a latent class model to relax the
assumption of homogeneity in preference for willingness to pay (WTP) for quality improve-
ments to the Puerto Rican coral reefs. I determine distinct subclasses and their WTP for
amenity improvements in the population of visitors to Puerto Rico. Determining different
subclasses’ WTP allows for government policies that price discriminate using entrance fees
for beaches, entrance fees for the coral reefs, and/or excise taxes on goods and services.
My results indicate the two groups are indirect (beach goers, fishermen, etc.) and direct
(snorkelers, divers, etc.) coral reef users. I use the results to suggest an illustrative policy
that could raise approximately $9.9 million annually with a minimal impact on tourism.
In my third essay, I incorporate respondents’ uncertainty for visitors’ WTP for quality
improvements to the Puerto Rican coral reefs and the Olympic Coast Marine Sanctuary. I
Paul Holden Conant – University of Connecticut, [2019]
use a novel methodological approach, the nested uncertainty measure (NUM), and three
goodness of fit measures to make comparisons to existing approaches that incorporate
uncertainty. I find that my NUM improves goodness of fit for almost every measure of
goodness of fit across two datasets (visitors to the Puerto Rican coral reefs and visitor to
the Olympic Coast Marine Sanctuary) and two identification strategies. However, it does
put positive pressure on WTP estimates exacerbating hypothetical bias.
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Chapter 1
Tightening Environmental Stringency and Its
Effect on Innovation: Evidence from the European
Union Emissions Trading System
Abstract
This paper is an ex post empirical analysis on the impact of environmental stringency on
induced innovation with an emphasis on firms’ temporal decision to invest in greenhouse gas
(GHG) related research and development (R&D). I use the European Union (EU) Emissions
Trading System (ETS) as my framework. My analysis is conducted using GHG-related
patent application data from the European Patent Office (EPO) on a panel of 88 countries
from 1977-2013. I find that firms anticipate future increases in environmental stringency
and strive to have patent applications submitted three years prior to the increases in
environmental stringency. I find evidence that increases in the level of environmental
stringency spur GHG-related innovations.
1
1.1 Introduction
Covering over 11,000 installations across 31 nations, the EU ETS is the world’s largest
market-based cap-and-trade system. It is arguably the most important application of
market-based economic principles relating to climate change. Understanding the impacts
of the EU ETS on GHG-related innovation is important for policy makers because GHG-
related innovation reduces the marginal cost of emissions abatement. Consequently, induc-
ing innovations will play an important role in limiting long-term effects of climate change.
The Porter hypothesis predicts that increases in environmental stringency increase the
value of innovation, and therefore incentivize firms to innovate, offsetting some of the costs
of compliance.
I examine two pertinent topics in the induced innovation literature. First, I set out
to understand firms’ temporal decisions to invest in GHG-related R&D in response to
environmental regulation. I answer the questions: when do firms make decisions about
investments in R&D in response to environmental regulation? Are firms anticipatory or
are they reactionary?
When firms respond to known future increases in environmental stringency has impor-
tant implications for policy design. If firms are anticipatory and if initial investments in
R&D occur before the increases in environmental stringency, then these known decreasing
targets will incentivize R&D more efficiently than a policy that updates later based on the
effectiveness of the previous year’s environmental stringency. If firms are reactionary and
if investments in R&D occur at the time of increases in stringency, then there is little to no
incentive to define targets in advance. In that case targets should be decided at the start
of any given compliance cycle and be based on how firms will respond then.
Second, I empirically evaluate how firms respond to increases in environmental strin-
gency. Are firms’ decisions to invest in GHG-related R&D a function of environmental
2
stringency?
Understanding how firms respond to increases in environmental stringency affects how
to structure environmental regulations to induce desired levels of innovation. Firms in-
novating behavior has implications for forecasting the costs and benefits of compliance,
and consequently affects the profitability of the firms. Identifying what measure of envi-
ronmental stringency firms are responding to will help policy makers create efficient new
environmental regulation and amend existing environmental regulation.1
This paper is an ex post analysis of the impact of known binding targets on regulated
firms’ decisions to innovate. I find that firms anticipate reductions to the marketwide emis-
sions cap and strive to have patent applications submitted three years prior to the increase
in environmental stringency. I find that with the inception of the cap-and-trade market
and with the availability of permit price, firms make investment decisions in response to
the current permit price. I find evidence that increases in either measure of environmental
stringency spur innovation.
In addition, this paper broadly assesses the innovating behavior stemming from the
EU ETS. Only a few papers have focused on induced innovation stemming from the Ky-
oto Protocol (Calel & Dechezleprêtre 2016, Johnstone et al. 2010, Lofgren et al. 2013,
Pontoglio 2008). Understanding how firms will respond to environmental regulation has
implications for structuring optimal environmental policies by helping to forecast the costs
and the benefits of compliance.
I use GHG-related patent application data from the European Patent Office. These
patent applications, extracted from Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
1For example, if firms are responding primarily to the price of permits in the market, binding price
floors and binding price ceilings may be added to a cap-and-trade market to prevent low levels of induced
innovation, while allowing firms to still be profitable. Alternatively, if firms are measuring environmental
stringency using percentage reductions of the emissions cap, a monotonically decreasing cap would be ideal
for inducing innovation regardless of the current permit price.
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ment (OECD) statistical database, provide me with a measure of GHG-related innovating
performance by nation by year.
Economist have long debated how to identify the ideal measure of innovation. Existing
alternative measures of innovation (number of scientific personnel employed, R&D expen-
ditures, etc.) are imperfect input driven measures of innovation. These measures can be
difficult to aggregate and it can be difficult to parse out what a change in one of these
measures is in response to.2
Patent counts have emerged as a conventional way to measure innovating behavior due
in part to limitations of alternative measures. Patent application counts are an output,
thus measure innovating behavior better than inputs such as R&D expenditures or number
of scientific personnel employed. Patent statistics are readily available, are objective, and
are granted on the basis of inventiveness. Consequently, this makes patent applications a
good reflection of innovative performance (Griliches 1990).
Most significant innovations are patented, because patents give the company the right
to exclude others from making, using, or selling an invention. This provides a strong
incentive for firms to apply for patents, which makes the count of patents a strong indicator
of innovating performance. Patent applications must satisfy certain criteria in order to be
granted, including a non-obvious inventive step and commercial viability (Dernis & Kahn
2004, Vans et al. 2001).
Patent data are categorized by type allowing for a subtler distinction of innovation.
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) categorizes 35 International Patent
Classifications (IPC). The IPC provides for a hierarchical system of language independent
symbols for the classification of patents according to the different areas of technology to
2For example, if one more scientific personnel is being employed by ExxonMobil is that in response to a
new environmental regulation or is that driven by internal or industry specific factors? R&D expenditures
often cannot be disaggregated. Is an increase in R&D expenditure by China Shenhua Energy necessarily
triggered by environmental regulation?
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which they pertain, including GHG-related patents. This GHG-related patent classification
was added in 2012.3 This addition allows me to identify patents that stem directly from
environmental regulation relating to climate change. The patent application data used
in this paper is the aggregation of three sub-classifications under the IPC codes: climate
change mitigation technology in energy generation, sequestration, and production of goods.
Patent data have become the most prominent measure of innovating behavior (Deche-
zleprêtre et al. 2011, Dechezleprêtre et al. 2013, Dechezleprêtre et al. 2014, Dechezleprêtre
& Glachant 2014, Deckker et al. 2009, Johnstone et al. 2010, Johnstone et al. 2012, Popp
2002, 2006, 2011). However, it is not without its drawbacks including that patent data
represents a count of patents. Patent data do not distinguish between significance in terms
of impact and scope, as long as the patent meets the minimum criteria to be granted.
This results in patents being valued equally regardless of their capacity to reduce GHG
emissions or their capacity to reduce the marginal cost of abating GHG emissions.
1.2 Environmental Externalities and Induced Innovation
1.2.1 Environmental Externalities
Market forces provide insufficient incentive for firms to invest in GHG-related R&D. There
are two significant market failures associated with underinvestment in GHG-related R&D.
The first market failure is the tradition problem of environmental externalities. Investment
in R&D is costly and without market instruments (for example, a carbon tax, cap-and-
trade, command and control, etc.) there is little incentive for firms to invest in GHG-
related R&D. Consequently, it is necessary for policies to be designed to induce innovation
(Acemoglu 2002, Acemoglu et al. 2012, Hicks 1932).
3GHG-related patents were retroactively classified for patents submitted prior to 2012. Patent docu-
ments were tagged through search strategies by experienced expert examiners. This approach has since
been formalized into an algorithm (Veefkind et al. 2012).
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The second is the public goods nature of innovation (Arrow 1962, Dechezleprêtre &
Glachant 2014, Nelson 1959). Dechezleprêtre and Glachant (2014) found that the marginal
increase in patenting for policies implemented domestically is 12 times higher than the
average marginal increase in patenting for foreign nations. However, due to the number
of foreign nations in their sample, they found that wind power policies induce twice as
much foreign innovation as domestic innovation. While these environmental policies induce
domestic innovation, they also create technology spillovers due to the public goods nature
of patents. This provides a disincentive for firms without federal funding to innovate. Not
only does the public goods nature of innovation reduce the incentive to innovate, innovation
incentivizes diffusion of technology through knowledge transfers, which represents a positive
externality (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2011, Dechezleprêtre et al. 2013, Dechezleprêtre et al.
2014, Dechezleprêtre & Glachant 2014, Deckker et al. 2009, Lanjouw & Mody 1996, Popp
2011). Markets rarely put a value on knowledge transfers. In the absence of government
intervention, firms have little incentive to invest in R&D. Thus, government regulations
should be designed to correct this market failure.
1.2.2 The EU ETS and Induced Innovation
One of the first papers to examine Hicks’ (1932) induced innovation hypothesis, in an envi-
ronmental framework, was Milliman and Prince (1989). This theory paper examines firms’
reaction in terms of innovation and diffusion of technology in response to environmental
policy choice. Porter (1991) proposed that an increase in environmental stringency will
induce technological innovation. Porter postulated induced innovation will increase firms’
commercial competitiveness, domestic firms’ ability to compete relative to foreign firms.
Early empirical papers measuring innovative behavior include Lanjouw and Mody
(1996) who use environmental patent counts as a measure of innovating behavior and
6
diffusion of technology. Lanjouw and Mody (1996) find there is a strong domestic response
to regulations and that it is affected by the severity of regulations, as measured by pollution
abatement expenditures. However, they find limited evidence of environmental spillover
effect. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) studied the effect of lagged environmental expenditures
impact on R&D expenditures and industries’ inventive output, measured by patent counts,
impact on compliance costs. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) find that the cost of compliance is a
strong indicator of investments in R&D. However, they find little evidence that investments
in R&D reduce the cost of compliance. Popp (2002) examines the effects of increases in
energy prices on innovating behavior and concludes that firms do innovate in response to
price incentives.
Various empirical papers have since been written on how the choice of environmental
policy impacts innovation using patent data counts as a measure of inventiveness. John-
stone et al. (2010) examined the impact that different environmental policies have on
technological innovation in the renewable energy market. They used country-level patent
application count data and conclude that the choice of environmental policy plays a signifi-
cant role in determining patent applications. They found that tradable permits were likely
to induce innovation in competitive markets. Popp (2006) uses panel data at the national-
level to examine the innovative behavior of three countries: United States, Germany, and
Japan. He looked at the impact of domestic policies on domestic and foreign innovation.
Popp (2006) concludes that domestic innovation increases, but there was insignificant for-
eign R&D response to domestic policy.
While many articles have examined the link between environmental stringency and
innovation, few have been in the context of the EU ETS. The EU ETS is a relatively new
and ongoing policy instrument, which makes ex post analysis difficult. One group of papers
use the trial period 2005-2007 as their framework to examine innovating behavior using
7
qualitative survey data by firms regulated by the EU ETS (Hoffman 2007, Rogge & Hoffman
2010, Rogge et al. 2011, Schmidt et al. 2012). These papers use data from firms covered
by the EU ETS based in Germany with one using an international sample (Schmidt et al
2012). They establish that the impact on regulated firms’ investment in R&D remained
limited due to the trial period’s lack of environmental stringency. However, they find there
was evidence of a portfolio shift, both in terms of an increase in diversification of energy
inputs and a shift towards renewables.
Further empirical research has investigated the impact of the EU ETS on patents
(Borghesi et al. 2012, Borghesi et al. 2014, Calel & Dechezleprêtre 2016, Dechezleprêtre
et al. 2011, Dechezleprêtre et al. 2013, Dechezleprêtre et al. 2014, Dechezleprêtre &
Glachant 2014, Lofgren et al. 2013, Pontoglio 2008). Pontoglio (2008) and Lofgren et
al. (2013) looked at Swedish and Italian firm-level data respectively, over the trial period.
They find evidence of small positive increases in patents for regulated firms. Calel and
Dechezleprêtre (2016) use firm-level data across 23 counties and found a 36.2% increase
in low-carbon patents for regulated firms compared to their counterfactual, similar unreg-
ulated firms. However, because these firms only represent a small portion of all patents,
this only translated into a .38% increase in the global count of low-carbon patents over the
years 2005-2009.
There is a significant body of research before the trial period that focuses on ex ante
forecasts of the EU ETS permit price (Ellerman & Decaux 1999, Ellerman & Wing 2000,
Manne & Richels 1999, 2000, 2001, Springer 2003, Stevens & Rose 2002). Springer (2003)
reviewed 16 economists’ predictions after omitting two outliers and found a minimum
prediction of 6 USD 2000 equivalent, a maximum prediction of 44 USD equivalent with an
average price of 27 USD 2000 equivalent. These values are consistent with the first 2 years
of Assigned Amount Units (AAU) trading.
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Uncertainty surrounding the outcome of investments in R&D can lead to firms investing
too little in R&D (Nelson & Winter 1982, Popp 2005, Winter et al. 2000). Environmental
regulations, such as the Kyoto Protocol, that outline pollution controls far in advance can
reduce some of the uncertainty surround R&D. This leads to more efficient levels of R&D
and lower costs of compliance.
An ideal structure for mitigating the effects of a stock pollutant, such as GHGs, will
have a long time horizon (Fankhauser & Hepburn 2010). Short-term emissions targets leave
uncertainty, consequently reducing the incentive to invest in GHG-related technologies
(Vogt-Schilb et al. 2014). The credibility of future emissions caps is necessary in removing
the uncertainty surround long-term investments in GHG-related technologies. Lack of a
clear signal on future emissions caps will reduce investments in GHG-related technologies
(Aghion et al. 2014). The European Commission reduced the linear reduction factor4 from
1.74% to 2.2%. Firms may fear that if the European Commission is willing to increase the
environmental stringency due to political pressures, they may one day loosen the emissions
cap. This uncertainty, stemming from the European Commission’s credibility, may damage
the value of firms’ investments in GHG-related technologies (Helm et al. 2003).
1.3 Background the Kyoto Protocol and the EU ETS
The Kyoto Protocol entered into force December 11, 1997. It was the first international
treaty with specific binding targets for carbon emissions and GHG equivalent. It set targets
for 38 of 43 Annex I nations, which are comprised of developed countries and transition
economies (including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central and
4The linear reduction factor refers to the fixed percentage of the initial total quantity of allowances
(cap) that is not allocated for the next year. The percentage reduction refers to a percentage of the cap at
the start of any given phase. Consequently, this leads to the reductions being the same number of permits
each year within a phase.
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Eastern European States). These targets, listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol, specify
levels of reduction relative to a base year for each Annex I nation for the first and second
commitment period. The base year is generally 1990, but due to the fall of the Soviet
Union, many economies in transition were allowed to move their base year earlier, allowing
for a less stringent initial target.
The goal of the Kyoto Protocol was to stabilize rising global temperatures at no more
than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. 192 nations have signed and ratified the
Kyoto Protocol. 43 of the 192 signing nations are classified as Annex I and 38 of these
Annex I nations have binding targets in the first commitment period. The onus of reducing
anthropogenic GHG emissions is placed on these 38, more developed, nations. These
nations are considered to be more capable of reducing GHG emissions. These developed
nations are more culpable for historic GHG emission. Thus, these nations are considered
more responsible for the current global anthropogenic impact from GHG emissions. 24
of the Annex I nations are also classified as Annex II. These nations are members of
the OECD. They are required to provide financial and technical support to transition
economies and non-Annex I nations. These remaining non-Annex I nations are encouraged
to formulate action plans outlining their intention to implement sustainable development,
but have no specific targets.
The Kyoto Protocol introduced three mechanisms to ensure efficiency in compliance.
The first is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This allows nations with bind-
ing targets to earn additional Carbon Emission Reductions (CERs) by investing in GHG
reducing projects in developing nations. This mechanism was designed to stimulate sus-
tainable growth in developing countries while allowing pollution abatement to occur at
the lowest marginal cost to regulated firms. This should help curtail the problem of car-
bon leakage, which occurs when there is an increase in CO2 emissions in one country as
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a result of an increase in CO2 regulations in another country. The second mechanism is
Joint Implementation (JI). JI allows a nation with binding targets to invest in an emissions
reduction project in another Annex I nation. The investing nation is then compensated
with Emissions Reduction Units (ERUs) as a function of the abatement from the project.
This allows nations to work as a group instead of individually, thus effectively having to
hit their combined target instead of their individual targets. The last is Emissions Trading
(ET). ET allows firms within a nation to buy and sell AAU.
The Kyoto Protocol requires that signing nations present an action plan, outlining how
they intend to reduce GHGs to their target levels. This requirement, along with JI and ET,
resulted in the formation of the EU ETS. The EU ETS is an international cap-and-trade
system that regulates firms for EU member nations. The EU ETS action plan included a 3-
year “learn-by-doing” period spanning January 1st, 2005 to December 31st, 2007, followed
by the first commitment period January 1st, 2008 to December 31st, 2012, and a tentative
second commitment period spanning January 1st, 2013 to December 31st, 2020. Figure
1.1 provides a timeline for the EU ETS.
The EU ETS was launched in 2005 with the pilot phase called the trial period. It was
not mandated under the Kyoto Protocol. Rather, it was an effort by the EU to allow
firms to experience the cap-and-trade market with relatively low levels of environmental
stringency. In the absence of reliable emissions data, the trial period emissions cap was
approximated. The result was an emissions cap that was not particularly stringent and
only a slight decrease in business-as-usual (BAU) emissions outcomes. The European
Environmental Agency (EEA) monitors the EU ETS and imposed a 40 Euro fine per AAU
for noncompliance.
This learn-by-doing trial period included only the EU25. It represented the start of
the first international cap-and-trade system. During the trial period the emissions targets
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Figure 1.1: Timeline EU ETS
were set at the national level using Nationals Allocation Plans (NAPs), where each nation
determines their allocation of permits for their firms instead of a centralized body. This
trial period covered only energy intensive industries and power generators. Over allocation
due to NAPs, coupled with low estimates of the pollution abatement responses by firms,
resulted in the carbon market crashing in late 2006. This trial period was only successful in
establishing a market for tradable permits. Ultimately, the trial period did little to change
the global level of GHG emissions.
The second phase, called the first commitment period, started with the expansion of
the EU ETS to include Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein. The aviation industry as well
as nitrous oxide were added to the market and the penalty for noncompliance was raised
to 100 Euros per metric ton. The cap was substantially decreased to 6.5% below the 2005
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emissions level. The second commitment period reduced the number of permits allocated
freely to firms, auctioning approximately 10% of all permits. These reductions represented
a significant decrease from the expected BAU levels of emissions over the 2008-2012 period.
The third phase, called the second commitment period, started January 1st, 2013 and
will run through December 31st, 2020. However, it was not ratified through the initial
signing of the Kyoto Protocol. It was to come into force upon a two-third majority vote
of the Doha amendment. So far, only 75 of 196 nations have signed the Doha amendment
(European Parliament). However, the EU ETS has agreed to continue to hit their targets
through the year 2020. The second commitment period’s collective emissions target de-
creases each year by a linear factor of 1.74% from the first commitment period target. The
percent of endowed permits decreased to 50%. The other 50% were auctioned. Only 50%
of all reductions can come from the CDM. This cap is a centralized EU cap, which means
nations no longer have individual NAPs, thus limiting the likelihood of over-allocation from
countries protecting their firms.
Table 1.1: Targets European Union Emissions Trading System
EU-15 EU Nations
Country First Com Second Com First Com Second Com
Austria -13% -20% Bulgaria -8% -20%
Belgium -7.5% -20% Croatia -5% -20%
Denmark -21% -20% Czech Republic -8% -20%
Finland 0% -20% Estonia -8% -20%
France 0% -20% Hungary -6% -20&
Germany -21% -20% Latvia -8% -20%
Greece +25% -20% Lithuania -8% -20%
Ireland +13% -20% Poland -6% -20%
Italy -6.5% -20% Romania -8% -20%
Luxembourg -28% -20% Slovakia -8% -20%
Netherlands -6% -20% Slovenia -8% -20%
Portugal +27% -20% Cyprus N/A -20%
Spain +15% -20% Malta N/A -20%
Sweden +4% -20%
United Kingdom -12.5% -20%
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Table 1.1 shows specific country level targets in the first commitment period when
permits were still allocated at the national level. The percentages correspond to the per-
centage decrease from the estimated emissions levels for each country’s 1990 base year.
These targets are not uniform and are outlined in article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol. How-
ever, in the second commitment period country’s emissions targets were no longer allocated
at the national level. They were instead allocated at the cap level. These targets start at
8% below the total EU ETS 1990 emissions and decrease each year by 1.74%. The EU
ETS target is 20% by the end of the second commitment period 2020.5 Allocations in the
second commitment period were determined at the firm level by approximated historical
emissions, and then scaled to that year’s percentage of free allocations. For reference, the
size of these targets for the EU-15 during the first commitment period is 18,882,263,095
metric tons of CO2 equivalent. This means the 1990 base year level of emissions was
approximately 20,524,199,016 metric tons.
Figure 1.2 shows the relative levels of environmental stringency for the trial period, the
first commitment, the second commitment period, and the proposed targets for the third
commitment period.
The annual procedure for firms in markets covered by the EU ETS is called the EU
ETS compliance cycle. As part of the EU ETS compliance cycle each firm must first
provide a monitoring plan for the next year outlining their procedure for monitoring and
reporting emissions. These firms then provide annual emissions reports, which must be
independently verified by a third party. Each firm must surrender permits equal to their
emissions in metrics tons of CO2 by April 30
th of the next year.
There is little evidence of noncompliance in the EU ETS. The high cost of noncom-
5This is why each entry on the table is simply 20%. This does not mean that each country is endowed
with exactly 20% less than there 1990 base year. Positive values signify a maximum percent increase that


















































2 005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
APPROXIMATE	EU	 ETS	TARGET	BY	 YEAR
Figure 1.2: EU ETS Percentage Reductions from Base Year (1990)
pliance relative to the permit price and the third party verification are believed to have
predominantly led to compliance among firms. In the trial period firms were 91% compli-
ant and in the first commitment period firms were 97% compliant (Entract Report 2012).
Firms were only 78% compliant in the first year of the trial period (2005). This was most
likely the result of firms being unfamiliar with the EU ETS compliance cycle and not
strategic behavior. Table 1.2 shows the number of non-complaint installations by year.
Recall Kyoto regulates over 11,000 installations.
1.4 European Patent Office Application Process
The patenting process is broken down into nine stages. In the first stage, the firm sub-
mits all required information, including a description of the invention, claims, drawings
(optional), and an abstract. Then, during the second stage, if all of these are presented
correctly, the firm is given a filing date, which acts as a priority date in the event of a
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Table 1.2: Non-Compliance (2005-2012)
Year Non-compliant Installations Permits Not Surrendered Theoretical Fine (e)
2005 2,291 380,759,618 15,230,426,874
2006 323 31,508,650 1,260,343,726
2007 240 44,020,080 1,760,806,560
2008 335 90,214,830 9,021,471,945
2009 350 60,361,350 6,036,148,300
2010 320 66,445,760 6,644,584,640
2011 335 85,847,435 8,584,735,125
2012 371 75,811,624 7,581,156,093
TOTAL 4,565 834,969,347 56,119,673,263
similar claim being filed later. A more formal examination occurs to ensure the initial
paperwork has been submitted correctly. The firm has 12 months from the filing date to
determine which, if any, countries to file for protection in. Any country they file in during
these 12 months will have the same priority date as the application to the EPO. Then in
stage three, a preliminary search report is sent to the firm. This report will include relevant
prior art and will indicate an initial opinion on whether the patent is likely to be granted.
During the fourth stage, 18 months after the application, the patent is published. At this
point, the firm has 6 months to choose if it wants to continue seeking a patent and initiate
a formal substantive examination.
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Figure 1.3: EPO Patenting Process Approximate Timeline
During stage five, the firm’s patent attorney will defend the application to three EPO
examiners. If the firm’s invention is deemed to satisfy the three criteria, it is granted in
stage six. The three criteria are that the patent must be new and previously undisclosed,
include a non-obvious inventive step, and be capable of industrial application. During stage
seven, this patent must be validated in each of the national patent offices in which the firm
is seeking protection. In stage eight, other firms have 9 months to oppose the decision
by the EPO to grant the patent. Finally, in stage nine any decision can be appealed and
is reviewed by the independent board of appeals (European Patent Office). Figure 1.3
outlines the EPO process with the approximate number of months for each stage. The
months are based upon a substantive review that led directly to the patent being granted.
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1.5 Data
I have extracted GHG-related patent applications by year and by nation from the OECD
statistical database. This data is fractional patent count by resident inventor. Patent
applications were chosen instead of grants because there exists variance in the time it
takes grants to be awarded. Patents may vary in expected time to grant within nations
across patent types, depending on the nature of the patent. An application is recorded 18
months after its original application date upon publication as long as the application has
not been finally refused, withdrawn, or is deemed to be withdrawn. Whenever possible,
the application date not the granted date should be used as the relevant time placer for
patents. This is due to variance in the time a patent takes to be granted that occurs
largely at the review process stage and has varied over time and across patents (Hall, Jaffe,
& Trajtenberg 2001).
These patent applications represent a count of resident inventors; this means for every
patent application a country will receive an additional patent count if the resident inventor
is from that country. However, to avoid over counting, if an application has more than one
inventor, rather than award one patent in each country, fractional patents are awarded.
For example, if three inventors from three different countries are all listed on a patent
application each country would receive an additional one third patent count. A count of
resident inventors is ideal for measuring the innovative performance of laboratories and
researchers in a given country (OECD).
Rather than use the application date, I use the priority date. The priority date is
the date of the first application for this invention anywhere in the world. There is little
variation in these two measures. However, the priority date can be earlier. Firms can
claim a previous priority date for subsequent patent application for the same invention, as
long as the previous application is the first priority application for the invention and the
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new application is filed within 12 months (European Patent Office). Pottelsberghe, Denis,
& Guellec (2001) state the only clearly meaningful date from a technological or economic
point of view is the priority date.
My variable of interest, GHG-related patent applications, is the sum of three different
subcategories provided by the EPO. The first is climate change mitigating technologies
relating to GHG sequestration. GHG sequestration includes the “end-of-pipe” innovations
such as scrubbers, which are commonly used to prevent GHGs from entering the atmo-
sphere. These include CO2 capture or storage and capture or disposal of GHG other than
CO2.
The second is climate change mitigating technologies relating to energy generation. The
energy generation market is the largest market regulated under the EU ETS. These include
renewable energy generation, energy generation from fuels of non-fossil origin, combustion
technologies with mitigation potential, nuclear energy, technologies for an efficient electrical
power generation, transmission, or distribution, enabling technologies, technologies with
potential or indirect contribution to emissions mitigation, and other energy conversion or
management systems reducing GHG emissions.
The third is climate change mitigation technologies relating to the production of goods.
Climate change mitigation technologies relating to the production of goods captures in-
novations in energy intensive industries, another market regulated by the EU ETS. These
include technologies related to metal processing, technologies relating to the chemical indus-
try, technologies relating to oil refining and petrochemical industry, technologies relating
to the processing of minerals, technologies relating to agriculture, livestock, or agroali-
mentary industries, technologies in the production process for final industrial or consumer
products, climate change mitigation technologies for sector-wide applications, and enabling
technologies with a potential contribution to the GHG emissions mitigation.
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Figure 1.4: Average Patent Trends for the European Union Nations and Non-European
Union Nations
Figure 1.4 shows the trend for EPO patent applications for EU nations and non-EU for
each type of climate mitigating technology. These graphs represent the average number
of patent applications for nations in each group. There is a noticeable increase in GHG-
related patent applications that starts in the early 2000’s and increases even more sharply
in 2005 for both the EU nations and non-EU nations. However, the rate of increase that
begins in 2005 is much steeper for EU nations. There appears to be almost no difference
in trends prior to 2005 with the relative difference appearing unchanged. Each of the
three subcategories all have a similar trend, with climate mitigating technologies relating
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to production having the least noticeable post 2005 trend.
The nations included in my sample consist of all nations with available GHG-related
patent data provided by OECD.6 Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway all voluntarily joined
the EU ETS during the first commitment period even though they were not included in
the EU. Iceland’s, Liechtenstein’s, and Norway’s decisions to join the EU ETS may be
correlated with firms’ within these nations’ decisions to innovate. For example, if these
nations’ targets do not constrain, which they predominantly do not, joining the EU ETS
provides their firms an outlet to sell their excess permits. Thus, these nations may join, but
their firms have little incentive to innovate. A separate regression is run dropping Iceland,
Liechtenstein, and Norway. However, there was no change in significance and almost no
change in the magnitude of the variables of interest. Thus, the reported regression results
will include Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.
Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania joined the EU ETS at various times after the trial
period, but were left in the sample. These nations joined because they joined the EU. My
assumption is their decision to join the EU was not strategic behavior associated with the
EU ETS.
Changes in public opinion, changes in leadership, or external pressure may affect a
nation’s propensity to patent. Country and year fixed effects will not account for these
changes within a nation over time. I have compiled a non-GHG related patents variable to
account for patent trends within nations. This variable controls for variance in propensity
to patent within nations across time. A similar control was used in Carrion-Flores et al.
(2013).
Figure 1.5 contains four graphs. The first two graphs focus on GHG-related patent
trends. They show the trend for the highest average GHG-related patenting nations and
6Nations with fewer than two total GHG-related patents for the years 1977-2013 were considered to not
have available GHG-related patent data.
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Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics 1977-2013
Variables Observations Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Patent Applications :
GHG-Related 3,256 25.5 115.1 0 1,559.3
NonGHG-Related 3,256 904 3550.8 0 37003.1
Energy Generation 3,256 17.3 83.9 0 1,176.1
Sequestration 3,256 1.1 5.4 0 85.8
Production 3,256 7.2 28.3 0 373.4
Medical Tech 3,256 68.7 360.6 0 5,208.5
Pharmaceuticals 3,256 67.6 332.3 0 4949.8
Country Characteristics :
GDPβ 2,851 404.6 1,272 .30 16,700
Net Tradeβ 2,443 -.27 63.6 -837.2 359.8
Populationα 3,179 53.8 166.5 .01 1,357
Share of Energy Generated by Type :
Hydroelectric 2,852 25.2 29 0 99.9
Natural Gas 2,852 21.2 27 0 99.8
Nuclear 2,852 8.6 16.8 0 88
Oil 2,852 21.1 27.9 0 100
Coal 2,852 21.5 27.1 0 99.5
α: In Millions
β: In Billions
select upper middle patenting nations.7 There is little evidence of a trend prior to the Kyoto
Protocol signing, with a sharp increase in GHG-related patents after the Kyoto Protocol is
signed. The rate of change increases from the trial period to the first commitment period.
It plateaus during the first commitment period and then begins to decrease. While it is not
clear what caused the decrease over the last three years, one plausible explanation is that
firms initially scaled up production of GHG-related patents in anticipation of increased
value of pollution abatement, but, when the Great Recession ensued, it reduced energy
demand. This put negative pressure on GHG-related R&D in two ways. The first is
through lower energy demand, which reduced emissions and thus, the value of pollution
abatement. The second is reduced energy demand which reduced firms revenues and, given
firms short-term capital constraints, affected their ability to invest in GHG-related R&D.
7Nations 11-15 by average GHG-related patents.
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Figure 1.5: GHG-Related Patent Trends for Select Nations Binned by Similar Averages
Top GHG-Related Patenting Nations Upper Middle GHG-Related Patenting Nations
Medical Patents for Top Pharmaceutical Patents for Top
GHG-Related Patenting Nations GHG-Related Patenting Nations
The last two graphs show medical and pharmaceutical patents for the largest GHG-
related patenting nations. Medical and pharmaceutical patents exhibit a similar trend to
GHG-related patents. However, for both medical and pharmaceutical patents the United
States, a nation that did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, patents significantly more than the
remaining nations relative to the difference in GHG-related patents. The other difference
is the behavior that occurs near the end of each graph. Medical patents appears to be
the least affected by the Great Recession. It is possible, due to the significance of federal
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funding for medical patents, that they were relatively the least affected. Pharmaceutical
patents have the most significant drop off and it occurs prior to the drop off in GHG-related
patents. This could be due to a reduction in pharmaceutical expenditures stemming from
better air quality. This relationship, first noted in Deschenes et al. (2017), shows that a
cap-and-trade program targeting NOx reduced pharmaceutical expenditures. The Kyoto
Protocol targeting NOx would consequently, reduce pharmaceutical expenditures for the
EU ETS nations.
The three variables used to create GHG-related patents, Energy Generation, Sequestra-
tion, and Production, are included in the descriptive statistics Table 1.3. A separate model
is run for each of these variables to see if any of the three are driving the GHG-related
trend.
The summary statistics for my data are reported in Table 1.3. These other country-level
control variables were extracted from the World Bank dataset. I included GDP 2005 USA
dollar equivalent and population to control for a country’s wealth and size. I controlled for
the share of power generated by different sources in the energy market. This will control
for nations switching energy sources, which will affect GHG emissions without inducing
innovation. I controlled for net trade to account for carbon leakage.
My data cover 37 years and 88 nations with 2,385 observations in my unbalanced panel
dataset. Observations are lost in part due to nations in the sample coming into existence
during the sample time frame. For example, the Czech Republic was formed in 1992 after
the fall of Czechoslovakia. Observations are also missing due to various controls, including
national estimates of GDP and types of energy production, missing from The World Bank
dataset. However, almost all observations that are lost occur prior to the year 2000 and
should not bias my results.
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1.6 Empirical Framework
In order to examine the effects of tightening environmental stringency on R&D in the
framework of the EU ETS, I have constructed a fixed effects model of the form:




β3+y−2010 ∗ SecCom[y]i,t+n + α ∗Xi,t + σi + λt + εi,t (1)
GHGPati,t are patent GHG-related applications by country by year. Triali,t, FirComi,t,
and SecCom[y]i,t are dummy variables for if the country is involved in the EU ETS that year
for the trial, first commitment, and second commitment period, respectively.8 The second
commitment period is split by year. Consequently, there is one dummy variable for each
available year of data. i ∈ [1−88] is the cross sectional unit (country) and t ∈ [1977−2013]
indexes the year. n ∈ {3, 2, 1, 0,−1} determines the lead\lag specification. Xi,t is the vector
of observable national level characteristics (GDP, net trade, population, percent natural
gas, percent oil, percent hydroelectric, and percent nuclear). σi and λt are country and
year fixed effects, respectively. All residual variation is captured by the error term εi,t.
The coefficients of significance are β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, and β6 which correspond to the
difference in GHG-related patent applications for the treatment group, EU ETS member
nations, and the control group, nations that are not members of the EU ETS, that do not
have binding targets for each of the trial period, first commitment period, and each year
of the second commitment period.
8For EU ETS nations the Triali,t+n = 1 if t + n ∈ (2005 − 2007), the FirComi,t+n = 1 if t + n ∈
(2008− 2012), and for each year of the second commitment period, SecCom[y]i,t+n = 1 if t + n = y.
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Country fixed effects were included because of country level heterogeneity in patent
counts. Year fixed effects were included to account for variation in the outcomes that
happen over time and are not attributed to other explanatory variables.
In order to illustrate my identification strategy I provide an example of a lead two
specification. A lead two specification (n = 2) would entail observing the patent applica-
tions two years prior to the increase in environmental stringency. In this case, the dummy
variable for the trial period, which covers 2005-2007, would be shifted to 2003-2005. The
first commitment period would be shifted from 2008-2012 to 2006-2010. This two year shift
then allows an additional two years of data in the second commitment period which would
have dummies for 2011, 2012, and 2013. For example, the dummy for 2012 is patent ap-
plications filed in 2012, which is the firm anticipating the future increase in environmental
stringency in 2014. The intuition for this model specification would be that a firm’s objec-
tive is to have their patent applications filed two years prior to the anticipated increase in
the policy’s environmental stringency. The model specification would be of the form:
GHGPati,t = β0+β1Triali,t+2+β2FirComi,t+2+β4SecCom2011i,t+2+β5SecCom2012i,t+2
+ β6SecCom2013i,t+2 + αXi,t + σi + λt + εi,t (2)
1.7 Results
Results are reported in Table 1.4. Table 1.4 is the lead three (n = 3) specification from
equation (1). Bayesian information criterion (BIC) was run to determine which lead/lag
specification best predicted the model. This specification is in line with Lanjouw and
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Mody’s (1996) timing. The same model is run on six different patent counts: GHG-
related, climate change mitigating technologies relating to GHG sequestration, climate
change mitigating technologies relating to energy generation, climate change mitigation
technologies relating to the production of goods, medical patents, and pharmaceutical
patents.
Table 1.4: Estimated Coefficients of the Fixed Effects Model (n=3)
VARIABLES GHG-Related Energy Sequestration Production Medical Pharma
Trial 10.32*** 9.892*** 0.110 0.320 -60.53*** -41.54***
FirstCom 32.43*** 26.18*** 0.732*** 5.518*** -68.50*** -52.22***
SecondCom2010 51.37*** 43.90*** 1.262*** 6.204*** -45.92*** -64.88***
SecondCom2011 65.60*** 55.32*** 1.433*** 8.855*** -30.83*** -60.17***
SecondCom2012 60.85*** 50.22*** 1.734*** 8.893*** -24.53** -56.05***
SecondCom2013 55.84*** 44.28*** 1.738*** 9.826*** -25.64*** -56.63***
NonGHG-Related 0.0166*** 0.0108** 0.000613*** 0.00524*** 0.0892*** 0.102***
Population -0.265*** -0.218*** -0.0147*** -0.0324*** -0.559*** 0.256***
GDP .054*** .043*** .003*** .008*** .067*** -.024
Net Trade -0.112* -.065 -.016*** -.031*** -1.50*** -0.875***
Hydroelectric 0.0240 0.0104 0.0116*** 0.00211 -0.171 0.0318
Natural Gas -0.295*** -0.248*** -0.00689 -0.0399** -0.808*** 0.164
Nuclear -1.322*** -1.156*** -0.0162 -0.150*** -2.253*** -0.273
Oil -0.174** -0.174** 0.00674** -0.00647 -0.507*** 0.115
Constant 28.22*** 23.56** 0.807 3.850** 103.2*** -6.990
Observations 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389
R2 0.828 0.758 0.833 0.944 0.979 0.942
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗P < 0.01,∗∗ P < 0.05,∗ P < 0.10
My controls are highly significant, in almost every regression, with the exception of
hydroelectric. This implies that development indicators, energy switching and carbon
leakage all affect firms’ decisions to innovate. However, the share of energy generated by
hydroelectric does not affect propensity to patent.
The results are largely consistent with my hypothesis. Firms anticipate future increase
in environmental stringency. Thus, known increasing levels of environmental stringency
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spur innovation. GHG-related patents exhibit the desired trend of being positive, signifi-
cant, and increasing prior to increases in environmental stringency. The average number of
GHG-related patents increase from the trial period (10.3) to the first commitment period
(32.4). Then it increases again from the first commitment period to the first year of the
second commitment period (51.4), it continues to rise in the second year (65.6) and plateaus
in the final two years (60.9) and (55.8). The second commitment periods relative increase
in environmental stringency is much smaller 1.74% each year. The relatively small increase
in environmental stringency, coupled with the Great Recession, may explain decreases in
GHG-related innovation. The Great Recession represented a negative demand shock. This
demand side effect represented a pseudo decrease in the level of environmental stringency
by decreasing demand even while the EU ETS cap decreased.
Recall, my variable of interest, GHG-related patents, are the sum of energy, seques-
tration, and production. The decrease in GHG-related patents is driven primarily by a
decrease in climate change mitigating technologies relating to energy generation. Energy
patents exhibit the same trend, increasing up until the second year of the second com-
mitment period and then plateauing. This indicates that decreases in energy demand
decrease the relative value of efficiencies in energy generation, but do not have the same
impact on patents related to GHG sequestration or climate change mitigation relating to
the production of goods.9
The same regression was run using medical patents and pharmaceutical patents. These
regressions, reported in Table 1.4, were originally run to rule out the alternative hypothesis
that structural changes in the EU28 changed their propensity to patent innovations related
9Three additional specifications were run and are include in the appendix. The first, found in appendix
1.9.1, is the result for each of the n ∈ {3, 2, 1, 0,−1} lead lag structures. The second, found in 1.9.2, is a
robustness check where the same identification strategy is employed with the sample cut to only include
European nations. The third, found in 1.9.3, is a falsification test where the same indicator structure is
used, but the years are shifted to before the start of the trial period.
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to philanthropic ventures through government funding or incentives. If the EU28, unre-
lated to the Kyoto Protocol, invested more in R&D I would expect to see the same trend of
positive, significant, and increasing for medical patents and pharmaceutical patents. Med-
ical patents are negative and largely increasing, while pharmaceutical patents are negative
and exhibit no discernible trend. The range of medical patent increase is also significantly
smaller relative to the sample average (0.63) than the range of GHG-related patents to the
sample average (2.1).
The fact that the medical and pharmaceutical patents do not exhibit an increasing trend
likely indicates that my GHG-related patent trend was caused by the EU ETS. However,
medical and pharmaceutical patents do appear to be negatively affected by the EU ETS. I
propose two plausible arguments for the decrease in medical and pharmaceutical patents.
One plausible explanation is that EU ETS member nations are shifting federal support
away from medical and pharmaceutical R&D towards renewable energy. Another plausible
explanation is a decrease in medical and pharmaceutical spending due to reductions in local
pollutants stemming from the EU ETS. One of the pollutants regulated by the EU ETS
is NOx. NOx contributes to GHG. Unlike most other GHG, NOx also acts as a localized
pollutant causing respiratory problems in high enough concentrations.
My crowding out effect is consistent with other findings within the literature. Hotten-
rott and Rexhauser (2015) find that regulation induced environmental innovation causes
crowding out for other technologies. Popp and Newell (2012) find that there exists within
firm crowding out from environmental regulation. However, they do not find evidence of
cross sector crowding out. Deschenes et al. (2017) find that cap-and-trade programs tar-
geting air quality reduce defensive spending (spending on medication to prevent sickness)
in the pharmaceutical market.
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1.7.1 Country Time Trends
There appears to exist an underlying trend in GHG-related investment that starts prior to
climate change becoming a global concern. This prevailing technological progress, coupled
with my relatively long sample, lend to detrending. I run both linear EU time trend and
nonlinear quadratic EU time trend models to observe if this trend affects the benchmark
findings that firms, responding to increases in environmental stringency, increase invest-
ments in R&D.
Table 1.5: Estimated Coefficients of the Fixed Effects Model with Linear EU Time Trend
(n=3)
VARIABLES GHG-Related Energy Sequestration Production Medical Pharma
Trial 5.520 6.148 -0.293 -0.335 -38.08*** -23.70*
FirstCom 40.94*** 34.03*** 1.024*** 5.888*** -51.29*** -48.70***
SecondCom2010 76.35*** 67.15*** 1.757*** 7.438*** -40.79*** -75.21***
SecondCom2011 80.26*** 68.40*** 2.163*** 9.697*** -38.63*** -79.86***
SecondCom2012 65.56*** 54.37*** 1.950*** 9.248*** -39.32*** -80.50***
SecondCom2013 45.43*** 35.45*** 0.725 9.262*** -33.52** -79.23***
Trend 0.167 0.143 0.0193** 0.00482 0.293 -0.0946
Observations 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389
R2 0.832 0.765 0.834 0.944 0.979 0.942
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO NO NO NO NO NO
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗P < 0.01,∗∗ P < 0.05,∗ P < 0.10
With the linear and nonlinear time trend, Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 respectively, the trial
period loses significance for both GHG-related innovation and climate change mitigating
technologies relating to energy generation (Energy). There is mixed evidence on how
stringent the trial period was for the EU ETS and it seems plausible that it did not affect
BAU emissions levels. The remainder of my GHG-related innovation results are relatively
unchanged by the inclusion of the time trend. Similar to the benchmark result, the results
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Table 1.6: Estimated Coefficients of the Fixed Effects Model with Nonlinear EU Time
Trend (n=3)
VARIABLES GHG-Related Energy Sequestration Production Medical Pharma
Trial 5.138 5.799 -0.304 -0.358 -38.22*** -23.39*
FirstCom 37.28*** 30.68*** 0.923*** 5.673*** -52.66*** -45.72***
SecondCom2010 69.52*** 60.91*** 1.569*** 7.037*** -43.35*** -69.67***
SecondCom2011 72.00*** 60.85*** 1.935*** 9.212*** -41.73*** -73.16***
SecondCom2012 55.64*** 45.30*** 1.677*** 8.665*** -43.05*** -72.45***
SecondCom2013 33.83*** 24.84** 0.406 8.582*** -37.88*** -69.82***
Trend -1.335** -1.263*** -0.0227 -0.0491 -0.510 1.074
Trend2 0.0450*** 0.0414*** 0.00124** 0.00232 0.0191 -0.0360
Observations 2,386 2,386 2,386 2,386 2,386 2,386
R2 0.833 0.766 0.835 0.944 0.979 0.942
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO NO NO NO NO NO
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗P < 0.01,∗∗ P < 0.05,∗ P < 0.10
with linear and nonlinear time trends are monotonically increase until the second year of
the second commitment period (SecCom2011) with a sharp drop off in the final two years
of the second commitment period (secCom2012, SecCom2013). The magnitude is similar
with a more distinct decrease in GHG-related innovating behavior in the final two years of
the second commitment period (secCom2012, SecCom2013).
Table 1.7 show GHG-related patents across different fixed effects, controls and with
and without time trend variables. To address concerns of bad controls such as share of
energy generated by time being correlated with GHG-related innovating behavior or GDP
and net trade being influenced by number of GHG-related patents I run models with and
without my vector of controls (Xi,t). To address concerns that fixed effects may reduce my
identifying variation or that the prevailing technological progress trends may be driving
my results I both run my model with and without fixed effects and time trend variables.
The results are largely consistent across all the different specifications. For each specifi-
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cation GHG-related patents are monotonically increase until the second year of the second
commitment period (SecCom2011) and decrease the final two years of the second commit-
ment period (secCom2012, SecCom2013).
Table 1.7: Estimated Coefficients GHG-Related (n=3)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Trial 22.01*** 18.98*** 22.43*** 8.439*** 10.32*** 5.520 5.138
FirstCom 70.15*** 46.60*** 70.57*** 36.05*** 32.43*** 40.94*** 37.28***
SecondCom2010 109.5*** 64.14*** 110.0*** 53.60*** 51.37*** 76.35*** 69.52***
SecondCom2011 116.5*** 73.90*** 116.9*** 63.36*** 65.60*** 80.26*** 72.00***
SecondCom2012 100.2*** 62.95*** 100.6*** 52.41*** 60.85*** 65.56*** 55.64***
SecondCom2013 82.01*** 55.77*** 82.43*** 45.23*** 55.84*** 45.43*** 33.83***
Observations 3,256 3,256 3,256 3,256 2,389 2,389 2,389
R2 0.037 0.056 0.555 0.556 0.828 0.832 0.833
Country FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE NO YES NO YES YES NO NO
Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES YES
Trend NO NO NO NO NO Linear Nonlinear
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗P < 0.01,∗∗ P < 0.05,∗ P < 0.10
1.7.2 Emissions Cap
I will test how the relative magnitude of the emissions cap affects firms’ decisions to inno-
vate. I will use a fixed effects model of the form:
GHGPati,t = β0 + β1EmissionsCapi,t+3 + αXi,t + σi + λt + εi,t (4)
where (EmissionsCapi,t+3) is the percentage decrease in the emissions cap for a EU ETS
nation three years prior to the actual increase in environmental stringency. Consequently,
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the emissions cap in 2005 (1.5%) will impact the EU ETS nations GHG-related patents in
the year 2002. The specific percentage decreases are listed in Figure 1.2.
Table 1.8: Emissions Cap
VARIABLES GHG-Related Energy Sequestration Production Medical Pharma
Emissions Cap 4.417*** 3.608*** 0.116*** 0.693*** -3.547*** -4.819***
Observations 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389
R2 0.827 0.757 0.833 0.944 0.978 0.942
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗P < 0.01,∗∗ P < 0.05,∗ P < 0.10
These results are consistent with the weak Porter hypothesis that stricter environmen-
tal regulation provides firms with an incentive to innovate, which in turn increases their
competitiveness. Innovation, proxied by GHG-related patents, has largely increased as
environmental stringency increases. My results in Table 1.8 show for a 1% decrease in
the emissions cap the average EU ETS member nation increased its GHG related patent
applications by 4.4.
These results indicate a significant decrease in medical patents and pharmaceutical
patents corresponding to a decrease in the size of the emissions cap for the EU ETS. A
1% decrease in the emissions cap corresponds to 3.5 fewer medical patents and 4.8 fewer
pharmaceutical patents.
1.7.3 Futures Permit Price
Futures for one metric tonne of GHG equivalent are traded on Intercontinental Exchange
(ICE) financial market company. ICE is a clearing house market place that specializes in
the market for energy futures. These European Union Allowance (EUA) futures are bought
and sold by investors. EUA’s give the holder the right to buy at some price. The EUA’s
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have a quarterly cycle with an expiration date of the last Monday of the cycle. Figure 1.6
shows monthly futures permit price.
The market emissions cap only affects the market supply of permits. It does not incor-
porate the changes in demand, such as the demand shock caused by the Great Recession,
that may affect firms’ decisions to innovate. Thus, I wanted to explore if using the futures
permit price had a significant impact on my results.
Figure 1.6: EUA Futures Monthly Data (August 2005-July 2018)
It is possible that firm’s decisions to invest in R&D are a function of the current
futures permit price. With the inception of the cap-and-trade system permit prices become
available, firms could naively take the existing permit price as the expected futures permit
price. I will explore this by running a model of the form:
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GHGPati,t = β0 + β1PermitPricei,t−3 + αXi,t + σi + λt + εi,t (3)
where (PermitPricei,t−3) is the futures permit price three years prior to the observed
GHG-related patent applications. Futures permit price is simply a zero for years prior
to 2005 and for countries not involved in the EU ETS. Annual futures permit price was
calculated by taking the unweighted average of monthly permit price data over that year.
BIC was run to determine which lead/lag specification of when futures permit prices best
predicts GHG-related patents. It was determined that a lag three specification best predicts
the model.
Table 1.9: Permit Price Lag Three (n=-3)
VARIABLES GHG-Related Energy Sequestration Production Medical Pharma
Permit Price 2.60*** 2.11*** 0.07*** 0.42*** -1.20** -2.48***
Observations 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389
R2 0.827 0.757 0.833 0.944 0.978 0.942
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗P < 0.01,∗∗ P < 0.05,∗ P < 0.10
My results are reported in Table 1.9. These results indicate that the futures permit
price three years prior do influence the number of GHG-related patent applications. Per
dollar increase in the futures permit price a nation involved in the EU ETS has on average
2.6 more GHG-related patents. However, I find that an increase in the futures permit price
decreases investments in both medical patents (-1.2) and pharmaceutical patents (-2.5).
These results are consistent with Popp’s (2002) hypothesis that firms innovate in re-
sponse to price incentives. If we take futures permit prices from years 2005-2010 we can
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explore expected GHG-related patents in 2008-2013. The average monthly futures permit
prices were 21.8, 16.3, 14.8, 21.7 12.7, and 16.3 from 2005-2010, respectively. Thus, the
expected number of GHG-related patents is 56.7, 42.4, 38.5, 56.4, 33.0, and 42.4 from
2008-2013, respectively.
1.7.4 Event Study
In order to garner additional understanding about the effect of the EU ETS on the number
of GHG-related patents in the years following the start of the trial period I ran an event
study of the form:
GHGPati,t = β0 +
2013∑
y=1977
βy−1976 ∗ Y ear[y]t ∗ EUi + α ∗ Xi,t + σi + λt + εi,t (5)
The event study is reported in Figure 1.7. The EUi is a dummy variable indicating if a
nation is included in the EU ETS.10 Y ear[y]t is dummy variable indicating if it is year y.
11
This event study shows the effects the EU ETS has on GHG-related patenting behavior
for EU-member nations. However, unlike a typical event study, the event is non-uniform.
The start of the event is the first year of the trial period (2005). Then the level of en-
vironmental stringency increases in the first commitment period (2008) and each year in
the second commitment period (2012, 2013). This event study shows the general trend of
the EU ETS nations patenting behavior relative to the other non-EU ETS nations without
imposing my identification strategy’s indicator structure.
Figure 1.7 has two horizontal lines. The first, dashed, line goes through GHG-related
10EUi = 1 if the nation i is in the EU ETS and 0 otherwise.
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Figure 1.7: GHG-Related Patent Application Event Study
patents in 1977, the first year in the sample.12 Years with confidence intervals that lie above
this line have an average number of GHG-related patents that is statistically different, at
the 95% confidence level, from 1977. Notice there is little evidence of a change immediately
following the start of the trial period. This is likely due to the relatively low environmental
stringency in the trial period. The average number of GHG-related patents for an EU-
member becomes statistically different from 1977 for the first time in 2008 and persists
through 2013.
The second, solid, horizontal line goes through the year 2005. This line is at 25.32
GHG-related patents. The years prior to the inception of the EU ETS, the start of the
event (2005), are all not statistically different from 2005, thus indicating no pretrend.
121977 is dropped.
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There is a rapid increase in the number of GHG-related patents post the trial period. The
number of GHG-related patents is only statistically different from the 2005 level in 2011.
However, there is a clear trend of an increase in GHG-related patents starting in 2005.13
1.7.5 GHG-Related Patents Trend
I will explore the trend of GHG-related patents before the first year of the EU ETS and
after the first year of the EU ETS. I will run a model of the form of:
GHGPati,t = β0 +β1∗PreEUTrend+β2∗PostEUTrend+α∗Xi,t+σi+λt+εi,t (6)
where (PreEUTrend) is a trend variable for the EU-member nations prior to 2002, three
years prior to the start of the EU ETS. The timing is consistent with my lead three model
specification. The (PostEUTrend) is a trend variable for the EU-member nations for the
years after 2002.
The results are reported in Table 1.10. The trend variable for the period prior to the EU
ETS is insignificant for GHG-related patents, climate change mitigating technologies relat-
ing to energy generation, climate mitigating technologies relating to GHG sequestration,
climate mitigating technologies relating to the production of goods, and medical technolo-
gies. However, pharmaceutical patents exhibit a negative trend in the years leading up to
the EU ETS.
GHG-related patents and all three patents that make up GHG-related patents have the
expected positive and significant trend post the start of the EU ETS. This, coupled with
13Event studies for energy generation, production, sequestration, medical, and pharmaceutical patents
are provided in the appendix, Figure 1.8.
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Table 1.10: Patent Trends During The European Union Emissions Trading System
VARIABLES GHG-Related Energy Sequestration Production Medical Pharma
Trend Before EU ETS 0.114 0.114 -0.00043 -0.00024 -0.885 -2.320**
Trend After EU ETS 6.971*** 5.722*** 0.181*** 1.069*** -5.311** -10.73***
Observations 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389
R2 0.828 0.758 0.833 0.944 0.978 0.942
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗P < 0.01,∗∗ P < 0.05,∗ P < 0.10
the lack of significance prior to the the start of the EU ETS, indicates that the EU ETS
had a significant impact on firms in EU-member nations’ decisions to innovate and that
there exists no significant trend prior to the adoption of the EU ETS.
However, there is evidence of a decrease in medical patents (-5.3) and pharmaceutical
patents (-10.7). Medical patents exhibited no trend prior to 2002. Pharmaceutical patents
exhibited a relatively small negative trend (-2.3) prior to 2002. Thus, it appears, the
EU-member nations invested less in medical and pharmaceutical patents after 2002. One
plausible explanation could be a shift in federal support away from medical and pharma-
ceutical technology towards renewable energy. This unintended consequence of the Kyoto
Protocol could be a fruitful avenue for future research.
1.8 Conclusion
I find that firms do anticipate future increases in environmental stringency and that their
decision making incorporates this information. Therefore, these known incremental in-
creases in environmental stringency are important in order to incentivize regulated firms
to increase their investments in R&D. Environmental regulations are needed to correct
for negative externalities in the production of goods and services. However, the struc-
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ture of the environmental policy will have implications for the behavior of regulated firms.
My research indicates that when firms are regulated with known increasing environmen-
tal stringency they respond by incrementally increasing their investments in R&D. This
has interesting implications if firms are making decisions in advance, because without the
known targets or when firms believe that future targets may not enter into force, firms
will invest less in R&D today which will affect the amount of innovation in the future.
Decisions about environmental stringency and how to design optimal policy are essential
to lessening the burden of reducing the effects of global warming.
A similar model could be used in a different context. One such appropriate context
would be the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). This United States based cap-
and-trade system has a similar structure to the EU ETS with an initial cap that decreases by
2.5% each year starting in 2014-2020 and covering nine states. Barring a change in policy,
the 2020 end date could illuminate the timing surrounding firms’ decisions to innovate.
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1.9 Appendix
1.9.1 GHG-related with Different lead/Lags
Table 1.11: GHG-Related Patents with Fixed Effects (n ∈ {3, 2, 1, 0,−1})
VARIABLES (n=3) (n=2) (n=1) (n=0) (n=-1)
Trial 10.32*** 10.67*** 13.90*** 21.83*** 29.41***
FirstCom 32.43*** 38.35*** 46.22*** 51.83*** 53.49***
SecondCom2010 51.37***
SecondCom2011 65.60*** 64.59***
SecondCom2012 60.85*** 59.87*** 59.16***
SecondCom2013 55.84*** 54.88*** 54.19*** 53.96***
Observations 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389
R2 0.828 0.828 0.828 0.828 0.828
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗P < 0.01,∗∗ P < 0.05,∗ P < 0.10
The results in Table 1.11 correspond to each of the different lead/lag specifications
n ∈ {3, 2, 1, 0,−1}. The dependent variable for all of these regressions is GHG-related
patents. The general trend, the number of EU ETS patent applications increasing at
faster rate than non-EU ETS patent applications, holds for each specification.
1.9.2 European Nations
In order to address concerns about patent application trends that could differ between
European and non-European nations I will show that the results do not change significantly
when I reduce the sample to only include European nations.
My application data are through the EPO, which could lead to “home bias”, i.e. higher
patent counts for European nations relative to non-European nations. This “home bias”
may then affect overall trends. However, I do not believe this will be an issue, largely
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because I have controlled for non-GHG related patent applications. This control should
address any home bias because it provides me with a relative patent trend that for non-
European nations will have the same home bias as will the GHG-related patent applications.
Table 1.12: Fixed Effects European Nations
VARIABLES GHG-Related Energy Sequestration Production Medical Pharma
Trial -3.509 -2.236 -0.515 -0.759 -6.602 12.06**
FirstCom 36.97*** 29.41*** 0.909** 6.643*** 1.941 -16.71**
SecondCom2010 81.69*** 70.20*** 2.458*** 9.037*** 17.69*** -52.84***
SecondCom2011 85.76*** 71.52*** 2.164*** 12.08*** 29.46*** -53.61***
SecondCom2012 68.79*** 55.98*** 2.056*** 10.76*** 21.99*** -50.15***
SecondCom2013 47.46*** 36.29*** 0.976*** 10.20*** 27.83*** -42.28***
Observations 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068
R2 0.841 0.784 0.749 0.934 0.969 0.949
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗P < 0.01,∗∗ P < 0.05,∗ P < 0.10
My results are reported in Table 1.12. While there is some movement of the coefficients,
the trend is nearly identical. The average number of EU28 GHG-related patents rose far
more than other European nations early in the second commitment period. However,
before what I defined as a plateau for the last two years of the second commitment period
appears far more pronounced. There is a significant decrease in GHG-related patents in
the final two years.
The medical patents trend is positive, significant, and increasing. This provides evi-
dence that, relative to non-EU European nations, the EU28 increased funding for medical
research over this time. This implies that the reduction in medical patents observed in
Table 1.4 is driven by differences in patenting behavior between EU28 member nations and
non-European nations. This result is not mutually exclusive to Table 1.4. It does, how-
ever, imply that non-EU European nations also experienced reductions in medical patents
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during this time.
The positive trend for medical patents is significantly smaller than the trend for GHG-
related patents. The range of medical patent increase is significantly smaller relative to
the sample average (0.62) than the range of GHG-related patents to the sample average
(3.2). The sample average of GHG-related patents rose to 26.5 and the sample average of
medical patents fell to 55.9.
1.9.3 Falsification Test
In an effort to determine if there were any changes in GHG-related patenting behavior
before the start of the EU ETS or if the indicator structure affected the interpretation of
the results, I have run a falsification test of the form:
GHGPati,t = β0+β1Triali,t+3+β2FirComi,t+3+β3SecCom1998i,t+3+β4SecCom1999i,t+3
+ β5SecCom2000i,t+3 + β6SecCom2001i,t+3 + αXi,t + σi + λt + εi,t (7)
In order to dissuade concerns that my results are driven by differences in GHG-related
patent trends between the treatment and control group and not by the EU ETS, I would
expect running this same model, but using years prior to the Kyoto Protocol entering into
force, I would get similar results. Thus, using the same dummy variables structure and
using the years immediately prior to the earliest dummy of interest reported in my results,
I answer whether it is differences in trends or policy change driving my results.
The new dummy variables are the trial period 1990-1992, the first commitment period
1993-1997 and four individual year dummies for the second commitment period 1998,
1999, 2000, and 2001. These years do not overlap with any of my dummies reported in
49
Table 1.13: Falsification Test
VARIABLES GHG-Related Energy Sequestration Production
Trial -19.91*** -17.49*** -0.501** -1.914*
FirstCom -16.48*** -12.99*** -0.579*** -2.917***
SecondCom1998 0.0570 0.587 0.370*** -0.900***
SecondCom1999 -1.944 -0.567 -0.0912 -1.286***
SecondCom2000 2.448 1.480 -0.167 1.136***
SecondCom2001 -13.88*** -10.09** -0.343** -3.444***
Observations 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373
R2 0.824 0.753 0.832 0.942
Country FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗P < 0.01,∗∗ P < 0.05,∗ P < 0.10
my results. The earliest dummy variable is the trial period for the lead three specification,
which started in 2002.
The results for the falsification test are reported in Table 1.13. For GHG-related
patents, all of the coefficients for my falsification test are negative or insignificant. With
only the trial period (1990-1992), first commitment period (1993-1997), and the second
commitment period in 2001 being significant. It is unclear why these periods are signifi-
cant. However, three negative and significant coefficients do not indicate there existed a
prevailing trend of EU ETS member nations’ investments in GHG mitigating technologies
increasing relative to non-EU ETS member nations’ investments in GHG mitigating tech-
nologies prior to the EU ETS is not particularly concerning. These results indicate that
my treatment and control groups are similar before the EU ETS originated and that the
structure of my identification strategy are not driving my results. My results appear to
not be driven by differences in the trends that existed prior to the EU ETS.
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1.9.4 Event Studies
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Chapter 2
A Non-Market Valuation of the Puerto Rican
Coral Reefs: A Latent Class Model Approach
Abstract
Coral reefs contribute to the social, cultural, environmental, and economic well-being
of Puerto Rican natives and visitors to Puerto Rico. The coral reefs’ value is a function of
their quality. In order to maintain or even improve the quality of the coral reefs revenue
must be extracted by the government. Vacationers to Puerto Rico may be the group most
able to pay for any restoration or management projects. Using latent class analysis, I
relax the assumption of homogeneity of preferences and allow for two distinct subclasses
who are willing to pay different amounts for quality improvements (i.e. more hard coral,
more ornamental fish, higher water quality, etc.). Determining different willingness to
pay (WTP) will allow for government policies that price discriminate using entrance fees
for beaches, entrance fees for the coral reef, and/or excise taxes on goods and services.
My results indicate the two groups are indirect (beach goers, fishermen, etc.) and direct
(snorkelers, divers, etc.) coral reef users. I provide an illustrative policy proposal, which
would raise approximately $9.9 million annually with a minimal impact on tourism.
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2.1 Introduction
Coral reefs contribute to the social, cultural, environmental, and economic well-being of
millions of people worldwide. In small-island states tourism contributes an average of 35%
of GDP (Secretariat 2000). Puerto Rico attracts approximately 1,171,368 visitors who
engage in some coral reef activities or approximately 352,822 households.1 These tourists
are responsible for $1.96 billion in economic stimulus (Leeworthy et al. 2018). Not only
do these coral reefs have value in terms of attracting tourists, but they also have value
for Puerto Ricans. Puerto Ricans use and visit the coral reefs. The coral reef generate
jobs related to the tourism industry, fishing, and management. Although fishing is not
a major industry in Puerto Rico, 6,178 metric tons of fish and shellfish were reported in
Puerto Rico from 1998-2001. The approximate value of the total catch was $27,407,302
(Matos-Caraballo & Alverez 2002). The Puerto Rican coral reefs play an important role
in the ecosystem as a whole and contribute to biodiversity.
Coral reefs are being degraded worldwide due to anthropogenic stressors, including
unsustainable fishing, land-based pollution, and climate change (Pandolfi et al. 2013).
Coral reefs are degrading at an alarming rate. Thermal stressors are causing most coral
reefs in the Caribbean to have coral bleaching between 20-60%. Puerto Rico’s coral reefs
have higher than average thermal stressors and 80% coral bleaching (Eakin et al. 2010).
Almost all of the Puerto Rican coral reefs are the highest level of threatened (Burke et al.
2004). The high risk factors for Puerto Rico included development, overfishing, sediment
and pollution, marine based sources, coral bleaching, and coral diseases.
It is more difficult and expensive to reverse damage from fishing, recreation, and coral
bleaching than to prevent these damages. Consequently, prevention is the more practical
1The average number of visitors per household was 3.32. The number of households was approximated
by dividing the visitors by 3.32.
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management approach (Yeemin et al. 2006). The rapid rate of degradation, coupled with
the cost to repair a coral reef relative to the cost to protect a coral reef, indicates that policy
management changes that happen sooner will have far more significant impacts than those
that happen later. The need for expedience makes protecting the Puerto Rican coral reefs
a priority.
Deterioration of the coral reefs will have a significant impact on the tourism industry
in Puerto Rico. Water quality in the Caribbean has deteriorated to the point that some
beaches are unsuitable for swimming. This deterioration has harmed the coral reefs (La-
pointe et al. 2014). The value of the coral reefs is a function of their quality. Tourists are
willing to pay more for higher quality attributes of a coral reef. Tourists may choose to go
elsewhere if the Puerto Rican coral reefs’ quality falls too far relative to alternatives.
Puerto Rico’s coral reefs are state owned, but have few management policies protect-
ing them. This leads to the problem of open access. Individuals have little incentive to
avoid overfishing or damaging the coral reefs through recreational boating use or diving.
Consequently, in order to protect the coral reefs, policy change will have to occur through
the Puerto Rican government.
While policy change must come from the Puerto Rican government, the Puerto Rican
government is not in a position to pay for protectionist policies. This paper focuses on
visitors’ WTP. Approximating visitors’ WTP will allow the Puerto Rican government to
generate revenue for policies without an increased tax burden on its people. For the survey
on visitor’s WTP for the Puerto Rican coral reefs, respondents are told that they will
be charged through an increase in the prices of goods and services. Thus, being able to
identify differences in visitors’ WTP will generate revenues closer to the total consumer
surplus than with zero price discrimination.
Past research has focused on individuals’ WTP, which is then aggregated as a measure
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of total non-market value (Leeworthy et al. 2018). However, this assumes preference homo-
geneity and largely ignores how to extract the revenue necessary to conserve and manage
coral reefs. My use of latent class analysis allows for a subtler distinction of individuals’
WTP. My ability to identify different subclasses with different WTP will allow for targeted
increases to the prices of goods and services. My model incorporates demographics in
determining class membership. Demographics were not incorporated in past models due
to past models being within estimates and demographics not varying across individuals,
coupled with the alternative specific constant (ASC) approach suffering from high levels of
correlation with dummy variables. These subclasses are predicted by demographic infor-
mation, which will provide the basis for price discrimination across these distinct groups.
However, which attributes respondents in each group are willing to pay for and how much
they are willing to pay for attribute improvements may be more illuminating in terms of
identifying these subclasses. Each subclass’s WTP for specific attribute improvements will
inform policy makers about which prices of goods and services they can increase and by
how much.
2.2 Literature Review
Approximating WTP for coral reefs is a well-established literature (Borg & Scarpa 2010,
Casey et al. 2009, Grafeld et al. 2016, Leeworthy et al. 2018, Park et al. 2002, Wallmo &
Edwards 2007). Leeworthy et al. (2018) focused on Puerto Rico. They used visitors to the
Puerto Rican coral reefs stated preference survey data, on household WTP for attribute
improvements from the “status quo” future forecasted attribute levels to feasible improve-
ments in attribute levels. Survey respondents were told they would be charged through
an increase in the prices of goods and services for any future policy management improve-
ments. Using the data from Leeworthy et al. (2018a), I will be identifying subclasses in
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the population who have heterogeneous WTP for attribute improvements.
WTP estimates have been used in the past to create illustrative policy proposals to
inform policy makers. Casey et al. (2009) looked at charging tourists an entrance fee in
order to raise money to protect the Mexican coral reefs. They found a mean WTP of $55
per visitor. When the per visitor WTP was aggregated to the visitor’s population, the
total non-market value was $275 million. However, they acknowledge that because it is an
average WTP charging it will reduce visitors, thereby reducing the revenue generated. For
illustrative purposes, they provide a conservative estimate of a $20 charge where half of the
visitors pay. Their illustrative policy would raise approximately $50 million. This estimate
highlights the concerns of assuming homogeneity of WTP in stated preference surveys.
If policy makers charge the average WTP, they disincentivize the use of the coral reefs.
Assuming homogeneity in preferences when determining management policy could affect
the Puerto Rican tourism industry and will likely not be the most efficient management
policy for extracting revenues from the visitors to Puerto Rico.
The past non-market valuation literature generally has not incorporated latent class
analysis with few exceptions. The use of latent class analysis in stated preference surveys
is motivated by a desire to examine preference heterogeneity across groups in the sample
population (Borg & Scarpa 2010, Schuhmann et al. 2013, Wallmo & Edwards 2007, Wallmo
& Edwards 2008, Westerberg et al. 2013).
Wallmo and Edwards (2007) examined individuals’ WTP for a marine protected area.
They elected to use a latent class model approach anticipating some individuals would have
disutility for some attributes that others would have utility for. Support for this belief in
preference heterogeneity was found, with some individuals valuing protectionist policies,
such as bag limits, while other individuals had negative value for the same protectionist
policies.
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Borg and Scarpa (2010) looked at snorkelers versus nonsnorkelers’ WTP for quality
improvements in Caribbean coastal waters. However, the latentency in their model is
derived from a belief in heterogeneity within snorkelers and within nonsnorkelers. They
find that snorkelers’ WTP is better predicted by a mixed multinomial logit model (MNL),
implying snorkelers’ WTP is fairly homogeneous. They find the nonsnorkelers are better
predicted by a latent class model, implying nonsnorkelers’ WTP is heterogeneous.
2.3 Survey Methodology
The Puerto Rico stated preference survey used in this paper was an inter-agency project
between the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and NOAA. Five different teams
were developed to examine the recreational-tourism effects of the Guanica Bay Watershed
restorations.
In order to better serve the community and the Puerto Rican government, island-wide
meetings with government agencies, businesses, and non-government organizations (NGOs)
were conducted on what they wanted from the study. It was determined that the project
should be expanded from the Guanica Bay Watershed to the recreational-tourism effects
of the island’s coral reef system as a whole.
The non-market economic values were approximated to support benefit-cost analysis of
different restorations strategies for the EPA (Leeworthy et al. 2018a). The Puerto Rican
community and the EPA wanted the capability to assess restoration and protection efforts
throughout the island’s coral reef ecosystems.
2.3.1 Visitors’ WTP
Puerto Rico’s financial situation was precarious before Hurricane Maria. Pantojas-Garcia
(2016) compares Puerto Rico’s financial crisis to Greece’s financial crisis. Puerto Rico has
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a per capita debt of over $20,000 or more than 70% of their gross domestic product. Due
to their lack of statehood, Chapter 9 of the United States bankruptcy code does not apply.
Chapter 9 of the United States bankruptcy code states that municipalities with their state’s
permission can restructure their debt through bankruptcy. Thus, Puerto Rico, not being a
state, cannot declare bankruptcy. In order for the Puerto Rican government to implement
restoration projects it will be necessary to identify a funding source other than the already
financially strained Puerto Rican people. Therefore, an effective way of extracting revenue
from the visitors’ population to Puerto Rico must be constructed.
One plausible way to generate such revenue would be to charge visitors to Puerto Rico
for recreation services. These visitors could be charged fees to enter the coral reefs, taxes
on fishing equipment, or an entrance fee to access beaches. Thus, it becomes necessary
to determine who is willing to pay for the restoration projects (attribute quality improve-
ments) and how much these individuals are willing to pay. This leads me to a latent class
analysis of the Puerto Rican coral reefs wherein I identify distinct subclasses within the
visitors’ population in order to extract revenue needed to protect the coral reefs, while
avoiding overburdening the Puerto Rican people.
2.3.2 Pretest and Focus Group Testing
In an effort to improve the survey design both focus group testing and a wide scale pretest
were employed. The pretest helped determine the maximum amount households might be
willing to pay for a bundle, resulting in a price of $1,000 being added. The wide scale
pretest had 192 survey respondents. The major revisions involved shortening the survey
and changing the relative prices.
The survey originally involved four stated preference questions, but was reduced to
two. The prices for bundles B and C were originally the same. However, there were
58
concerns that this may reduce the information obtained because it only allows for binary
price levels, option A for $0 or the price level of options B and C. Binary price levels may
result in underestimation of individuals’ WTP because individuals who are willing to pay
significantly more for certain attributes will not be able to signal that as clearly with binary
prices.2 There were also concerns that it may shift decisions into a two-stage problem where
the respondent first chooses if they are willing to spend the nonzero amount. Then, if they
are willing to spend the nonzero amount, they make a choice between bundle B and bundle
C. Ultimately, Leeworthy et al. (2018a) elected to use different prices for bundles B and
C, but ones that were still relatively close together.
2.3.3 Orme’s Formula for Statistical Efficiency
It is important to meet certain number of response thresholds in stated preference surveys.
Initially, survey responses were collected through an Internet survey. However, due to a low
response rate to the Internet survey and the need to meet the Orme’s formula threshold for
number of respondents, an in-person survey design was ultimately chosen. Orme’s (1999)
formula for statistical efficiency was applied and 750 survey respondents were needed to
satisfy it. Orme’s (1999) formula represents a benchmark for the minimum number of
surveys for statistical efficiency:
N = 500 ∗ [ NLEV
NALT ∗NREP
],
where N is the minimum number of respondents, NLEV is the highest number of attribute
levels (here six for the number of prices), NALT is the number of alternative choices (here
2For example, if an individual prefers high water cleanliness and nothing else and that individual is
willing to pay $400 for that attribute, if high water cleanliness appear in only one of bundles B and C
they will pick whichever one has high water cleanliness if that bundle costs less than $400. However, the
information gained here is more closely an ordinal ranking than a cardinal ranking giving less information
on WTP and more information on preference.
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two options B and C), and NREP is the number of stated preference choices per survey
(here two).
2.3.4 Survey Design
Survey respondents were presented with two stated preference scenarios, each with three
options to choose from. The options consist of one option with all low level attributes for
a price of $0 and two options with low, medium, and high level attributes each with a
nonzero price attached. These prices were determined in part through the focus groups
and wide scale pre-test, with an objective of being both reasonable and avoiding issues
associated with fat tails. Fat tails are avoided when almost all survey respondents reject
the highest price ($1000) and almost all survey respondents accept the lowest price ($60).
The concern with fat tails is that if respondents are choosing a $1000 option it only informs
us about the lower bound of what they are willing to pay. For any individual choice, the
two nonzero prices for options B and C were chosen such that they were never more than
two price levels apart. Thus, $60 and $1000 would never appear together. The concern for
prices that are far apart is that they provide less information about an individual’s WTP.
It is unlikely that an individual’s consumer surplus would be maximized at a price of $1,000
given a bundle costing only $60 was also present, even if that individual was willing to pay
more than $1,000 for the $1,000 option.3
There were eighteen different versions of the survey administered, each with two dis-
tinct stated preference questions. In my model specification the attribute levels are coded
as dummies. Consequently, simple randomization would likely lead to high levels of cor-
relation. A SAS program was employed to ensure orthogonal design and to minimize
3A simple example would be an individual who is willing to pay $200 for a bundle costing $60 and
who is willing to pay $1,100 for a bundle costing $1,000. That individual would maximize their consumer
surplus choosing the $60 bundle (200-60=140) over the $1000 bundle (1,100-1,000=100).
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correlation between attribute levels.4
2.4 Data
The household level survey data were collected in Puerto Rico at various locations including
San Juan, Isla Verde, and Dorado from October 2016 through May 2017. Students from the
University of Puerto Rico administered the surveys in person. The surveys were designed
to be administered in approximately 15 minutes.
Respondents were between the ages of 18 and 80 with an average age of 40. The average
income per vacationer was $30,000. 75.4% of respondents were in Puerto Rico for vacation.
The majority of respondents were white (69%). The ratio of male to female respondents
was almost even with 49% being male.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics Puerto Rico
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Reason for Visit:
Vacationer .754 .43 0 1
Visiting Family .12 .33 0 1
Business Trip .03 .18 0 1
Business/Pleasure .082 .27 0 1
Demographics:
Income Per Vacationerα 29.97 23.68 .367 200
Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino .23 .42 0 1
Male .49 .50 0 1
White .69 .47 0 1
Ageβ 4.03 1.25 1.8 8
α: In Thousands
β: In Tens
Individuals were approached at random and asked if they were willing to participate
in a survey. They were first asked if they were visitors to Puerto Rico. If not, they were
4A list of all attributes and the specific quality characteristics corresponds to that level are provided in
the appendix Table 2.11. A sample stated preference question is provided in Table 2.12.
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thanked and the survey ended. Then they were asked if they participated in any coral
reef related activity. If not, they were thanked and the survey ended. Lastly, they were
asked if they were nearing the end of their stay. If not, they were thanked and the survey
ended. This question was important for the activity participation portion of the survey.
776 surveys were administered. After surveys with missing responses and protesters were
identified and removed from the sample, 693 surveys remained or 4,158 observations.
2.4.1 Price
Price refers to the per trip cost to the household for each alternative option. There were six
prices semi-randomly5 assigned in the optimal design to different alternatives: $60, $125,
$250, $500, $750, and $1000. Each price represents the per trip additional cost that would
be assessed to the household for the attached alternative option. The Status Quo or all low
level attributes (opt out choice) was always priced at $0. For estimation purposes, price
was scaled to thousands of dollars (Price1000).
2.4.2 Income
Household Income was categorized into 15 different ranges for before taxes income, with
an additional category for those that “refused” to answer. These 15 ranges are listed in
(Table 2.2) along with the range midpoint rounded to the nearest dollar.
However, due to the 27.99% rate of “refused” to answer (Table 2.3) in order to use
income, it was necessary to predict missing income levels. In order to predict these missing
values, demographics were concatenated from three datasets: Pretest onsite, onsite, and
airport. A negative binomial model, using race, age, age squared, reason for visit, and
ethnicity (Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino) was run. Similar to Poisson’s model, the negative
5The prices never vary by more than two price levels. The different price levels appear roughly with
the same frequency across all of the different surveys.
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Table 2.2: Income Ranges
Variables Description Range Midpoint ($1,000)
1 Less than $5,000 2.5
2 $5,000 to $9,999 7.5
3 $10,000 to $14,999 12.5
4 $15,000 to $19,999 17.5
5 $20,000 to $24,999 22.5
6 $25,000 to $29,999 27.5
7 $30,000 to $34,999 32.5
8 $35,000 to $39,999 37.5
9 $40,000 to $44,999 42.5
10 $45,000 to $49,999 47.5
11 $50,000 to $59,999 55
12 $60,000 to $74,999 67.5
13 $75,000 to $99,999 87.5
14 $100,000 to $149,999 125
15 $150,00 or more 200
16 ”Refused” —
binomial model can be used with integer data. However, the negative binomial relaxes
the assumption that the mean equals the variance. The coefficients of this model were
then used to predict categories of income (1-15) rounded to the nearest integer for all
respondents who chose “refused”.
A new variable (Income) was generated by replacing all “refused” to answers with the
predicted incomes. This variable was then used to generate a numeric variable (Income-
Cont) with each category number being replaced by the range midpoint scaled by $1000
for model estimation purposes.
2.4.3 Protesters
In stated preference modeling it is important to identify “protesters”. Protesters are re-
spondents who reject the survey’s scenario. These individuals will not reveal their true
WTP and need to be removed from the sample population. In order to identify these
protesters a thorough analysis was run using three Likert-type questions with scales rang-
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Table 2.3: Percentage of Households by Income Range

















ing from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and one yes or no question:
I. I found it difficult to select an option of reef conditions I preferred. (1-5)
II. I was concerned that the Puerto Rico government cannot effectively manage coral
reefs. (1-5)
III. I should not have to pay more to protect or restore coral reefs in Puerto Rico. (1-5)
IV. Did you believe the information by coral scientists that in 10 to 20 years if current
management practices continue that nearly all the coral reefs in Puerto Rico would
be in a poor or low condition? (yes or no)
The individual’s choice of options were incorporated to see if they selected the status
quo for both responses. If an individual chose 4 (somewhat agree) or 5 (strongly agree) for
I-III and the status quo for both options, they were labeled a protester. They were also
labeled a protester if they chose no for question IV. Choosing no for IV signaled that the
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Table 2.4: Respondent Protesters
Protester Statements Possible Protesters
I found it difficult to select an option of reef conditions I pre-
ferred
20.44%
was concerned that the Puerto Rican Government cannot effec-
tively manage coral reefs
58.20%
should not have to pay more to protect or restore coral reefs in
Puerto Rico
32.42%
Chose option ”A” for both choices 20.31%
Chose 4 or 5 for all three and option ”A” for both choices 1.97%
you believe the information by coral scientists that in 10 to
20 years if current management practices continue that nearly




individual did not believe in the status quo option, and thus rejected the scenario. Table
2.4 shows the percentage of respondents who were flagged on each individual question and
the percentage of protesters ultimately dropped.
Mean comparison tests were run to determine if the protesters were statistically different
from the sample population. Protesters had significant differences with on average higher
household income, cared less about the environment, were older, were more likely to be
male, and were more likely to be white. However, there was no statistical difference between
Hispanic, Latino, and Spanish respondents and non-Hispanic, non-Latino, and non-Spanish
respondents.
2.4.4 Price Per Trip
The price per trip is discussed on the Visitor’s management solutions card. This card is
handed directly to the respondent prior to the beginning of the survey. The first statement
reads: The cost per trip is based on the costs that will be paid by businesses and households
to pay for investments that protect and restore the coral reef ecosystems like improved sewage
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treatment, filtering and cleaning urban run-off, erosion control from agricultural areas and
development projects, installation of mooring buoys to protect reefs from anchor damage,
restoration of reefs, and enforcement of rules and regulations.
This statement defines some of the potential restoration projects. The significance of
this statement is that it lends credibility to the survey’s stated preference questions by
outlining specific potential future actions.
The payment vehicle is defined in a statement that reads: The costs per trip would
be paid by all residents and visitors to Puerto Rico through increased prices of goods and
services. This might also include increases in local sales taxes to cover government costs
to pay for protection and restoration.
Choosing a payment vehicle is crucial in stated preference models. How a payment
vehicle is defined can impact WTP (Morrison 2000, Campos et al. 2007). However, there
is little consensus on which payment vehicle is unequivocally best. The guideline set forth
by the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation is simply to define a payment vehicle that is
most likely to be employed ultimately (Arrow et al. 1993). Therefore, when I discuss my
illustrative policy proposal, in order to be consistent with the payment vehicle defined in
the survey, the payment vehicle will be increases of the prices of goods and services.
2.5 Model Specification
Using the expectation-maximizing (EM) latent class logit (LCL) model outlined in Pacifico
and Yoo (2013), I have estimated the two-class LCL model of the form:
Ynjt = αDnjt + β
PrPricenjt + εnjt,
where n is the respondent number, j is the choice number, and t is the number of different
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scenarios. ynjt is 1 if the respondent selected that choice for that scenario or 0 otherwise.
Dnjt is the vector of dummy variables representing the attribute levels for respondent n,
choice j, and scenario t. Pricenjt is the corresponding price for each option.
The EM LCL model uses respondents’ demographics to sort individuals into each of m
subclasses. The number of subclasses must first be determined by independently running
EM LCL with each subclass specification you wish to test, here m ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}.6
Then membership is determined through an EM algorithm using the continuous observed
variables (demographics). The EM algorithm for fitting an LCL model is outlined in
detail in Pacifico and Yoo (2013). Each respondent is ultimately sorted into one of the m
subclasses. Then the logit model is run independently on each subclass.7
After the LCL model is run, respondents’ WTP for each attribute improvement within





where i is the specific dummy variable (e.g. low to medium attribute improvement of soft
coral) and βPrm is the coefficient for price.
8
2.5.1 Bayesian Information Criterion
The optimal number of subclasses must be determined before the above LCL model can be
estimated. Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
were predicted for a model with subclasses two through nine. The AIC and BIC were both
6More subclasses can be tested, however BIC was monotonically decreasing and eight or more subclass
failed due to nonsingular matrices, implying that there were not distinct subclasses beyond seven.
7The demographics are only used in the sorting of respondents into subclasses. Demographics include:
Income Per Vacationer, reason for visiting Puerto Rico (Vacationer, Visiting Family, Business Trip, Busi-
ness/Pleasure), Gender, Hispanic, Spanish, or Latino, and Age.
8For analytic convenience, so the coefficient on price was not extraordinarily low, I scaled price by
$1000.
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optimized at two subclasses. Table 2.5 shows the results for the two subclass case and is
provided in the appendix.9
2.6 Results
The class membership indicates that respondents in class two are more likely to be wealth-
ier, younger, and Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino. Targeted increases in the price of goods and
services would mostly center around luxury goods and activities that younger vacationers
are more likely to partake in.
However, what is more informative is differences in each subclasses’ WTP for attribute
improvements. Class one only positively and significantly values low to medium consump-
tive fish ($315.79), medium to high consumptive fish ($27.57), low to medium crowdedness
($154.14), and medium to high crowdedness ($104.01). However, while these respondents
are willing to pay for less crowded beaches, they are specifically not willing to pay for low
to high water cleanliness or any improvements to water clarity. This indicates a indirect
usage of the coral reefs. These individuals are likely beach goers or fishermen who have a
preference for a quiet beach for fishing or lounging.
Class two is willing to pay significantly more for almost every attribute, and the co-
efficients of almost every attribute are positive and significant. These individuals value
the reef far more than class one. They especially value attributes that imply direct usage,
including low to high water cleanliness ($633.28), low to high stony coral ($133.13), low to
high soft coral ($112.33), low to high ornamental fish ($192.60), low to high large wildlife
($255.78), low to high water clarity ($78.12), and low to high crowdedness ($-220.34)10.
9The two subclass case without demographics (Table 2.9), and three subclass case (Table 2.10) are
reported in the appendix.
10A negative WTP is interpreted as a WTP for the opposite of attribute improvement. Here, group two
is willing to pay more for a more crowded beach. This heterogeneity in preference for beach crowdedness
is consistent with observations made in Leeworthy et al. (2014).
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Table 2.5: Latent Class Model: Two Subclasses
Class One Class Two
Variable Coefficient WTP Coefficient WTP
Price1000 -3.99*** -6.49***
High Water Cleanliness -.211 -52.88 4.11*** 633.28***
Medium Stony Coral -.544** -136.34** 1.46*** 224.96***
High Stony Coral -.242 -60.65 .864*** 133.13***
Medium Soft Coral .056 14.03 .364 56.09
High Soft Coral -.340 -85.21 .729*** 112.33***
Medium Consumptive Fish 1.26*** 315.79*** -1.51*** -232.67***
High Consumptive Fish 1.37*** 343.36*** -1.41*** -217.26***
Medium Ornamental Fish .250 62.66 -.274*** -42.22***
High Ornamental Fish -.552** -138.34** 1.25*** 192.60***
Medium Invertebrates -.265 -66.66 .817 125.89
High Invertebrates .177 44.36 1.39*** 214.18***
High Large Wildlife -.258 -64.66 1.66*** 255.78***
High Sport Fish -1.08 -270.68 2.59*** 399.08***
Medium Water Clarity .207 51.88 -.666** -102.62**
High Water Clarity -.071 -17.79 .507** 78.12**
Medium Crowdedness .615*** 154.14*** -.908*** -139.91***
High Crowdedness 1.03*** 258.14*** -1.43*** -220.34***
Class Membership .545 .455
Membership Class One Standard Error Class Two
Income Per Vacationer -.024*** .000 0.00
Vacationer .978 .159 0.00
Visiting Family 1.27* .088 0.00
Business Trip 3.07*** .004 0.00
Business/Pleasure 1.06 .168 0.00
Male .015 .943 0.00
Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino -.750*** .008 0.00
White -.169 .500 0.00
Age .107 .183 0.00
Constant -.309 .692 0.00
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗P < 0.01,∗∗ P < 0.05,∗ P < 0.10
The two classes are of similar size with class one representing 54.5% of the respondents,
while class two represents 45.5% of the respondents. Without price discrimination any
entrance fee for the coral reefs would almost necessarily dissuade all class one respondents
from entering the coral reefs, and would thus capture almost zero consumer surplus from
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Table 2.6: Class One WTP
Variable Low to Medium Medium to High Low to High
Water Cleanliness $-52.88
Stony Coral $-136.34 $75.69 $-60.65
Soft Coral $14.04 $-99.25 $-85.21
Consumptive Fish $315.79 $27.57 $343.36
Ornamental Fish $62.66 $-201.00 $-138.35
Invertebrates $-66.42 $110.78 $44.36
Large Wildlife $64.66
Sport Fish $-270.68
Water Clarity $51.88 $-69.67 $-17.79
Crowdedness $154.14 $104.01 $258.15
Table 2.7: Class Two WTP
Variable Low to Medium Medium to High Low to High
Water Cleanliness $633.28
Stony Coral $224.96 $-91.83 $133.13
Soft Coral $56.09 $56.24 $112.33
Consumptive Fish $-232.67 $ 15.41 $-217.26
Ornamental Fish $-42.22 $234.82 $192.60
Invertebrates $125.89 $88.29 $214.18
Large Wildlife $255.79
Sport Fish $399.08
Water Clarity $-102.62 $ 180.74 $78.12
Crowdedness $-139.91 $-80.43 $-220.34
class one. The class two respondents are willing to pay significantly more than the average
WTP of the previous results, discussed below. Thus, a higher entrance fee may capture
more consumer surplus from class two, while a small entrance fee for beaches or tax on
catch could extract some positive revenue from class one.
2.6.1 Previous Models Results
The homogeneous one class (no subclasses) model is featured in Leeworthy et al. (2018a).
These results are included for the purpose of comparing my latent class results with the
previous specification. The previous specification was the unweighted average of the three
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model specifications (conditional logit, nested logit, and random parameters logit).
Table 2.8: Previous Results Three Model Average WTP
Variable Low to Medium Medium to High Low to High
Water Cleanliness $255.78
Stony Coral $22.30 $30.31 $52.61
Soft Coral $41.19 $-54.35 $-13.15
Consumptive Fish $29.55 $65.76 $95.31
Ornamental Fish $25.47 $29.25 $54.71
Invertebrates $93.35 $2.12 $95.46
Large Wildlife $66.82
Sport Fish $209.30
Water Clarity $38.66 $15.15 $53.82
Crowdedness $11.87 $27.06 $38.93
The previous results represent an average WTP for the sample population as a whole
and assume homogeneity of preferences (Table 2.8). My latent class analysis assumes that
within a subclass preferences do not vary, but that there are heterogeneous subclasses. The
values across both results appear consistent with the weighted average of the WTP across
my two distinct subclasses being similar to the WTP for the previous specifications.
However, this highlights the importance of my results for any policy that extracts
revenues from the visitors’ population. For example, the WTP for high water clarity is
$255.78 in the homogeneous result and is $-52.88 for class one and $633.28 for class two
in the heterogeneous (two subclasses) result. If the Puerto Rican government charged an
entrance fee to the coral reefs of the $255.78 from the previous result for a management
policy which kept the water clean, all individuals in class one would not be willing to pay
that price increase. Thus, all revenue generated would come from individuals in class two.
However, class two’s WTP for high water clarity is significantly higher ($633.28). Thus,




Uniform price incentives will fail to capture much of the consumer surplus, because WTP
varies across individuals. Identifying distinct subclasses through individuals’ attribute
preferences and demographics will allow for targeted increases in the prices of goods and
services. This increased level of price discrimination will increase the revenue collected by
allowing policy makers to capture more of the consumer surplus. For class one, increased
price of goods and services could include a small charge to enter some beaches, making
them more private, or a tax on charter boats, fishing equipment, or total catch. For class
two, increased price of goods and services could include an entrance fee for the coral reefs,
or a tax on diving equipment.
A conservative illustrative policy proposal11 could include a $100 per vacation12 en-
trance fee for the coral reefs, a $20 dollar entrance fee on selected beaches, and a $2 bag
tax on per bag catch. The coral reef entrance fee targets class two and the beach entrance
fee and bag tax target class one. If I only examine the revenue generated from the entrance
fees and conservatively assume that only half of all people within the respective classes pay
the fees, this policy would raise $9,949,580.40.13
Non-market valuation is often used to identify total non-market value for an environ-
mental amenity for the purpose of conducting benefit-cost analysis on different management
scenarios. However, traditional forms of raising revenue for an environmental amenity, such
as an increase in taxes, ignore individuals’ WTP and will likely not be Pareto efficient.
Consequently, it is pertinent to identify heterogeneous WTP and a mechanism by which
policy makers can extract revenue that, when linked to a management scenario, is Pareto
11Conservative here means a policy proposal that is significantly less than the WTP found in my results
section.
12In practice this would probably be a 1-2 week pass, which would most likely ensure individuals only
pay once per vacation, but still pay multiple times for multiple vacations.
13calculation 1
2
∗ [100 ∗ .455 ∗ 352822 + 20 ∗ .545 ∗ 352822] = 9, 949, 580.40.
72
efficient. My model identifies heterogeneous classes and their WTP and my illustrative pol-
icy demonstrates a mechanism that can extract the revenue necessary to prevent further
damage to the coral reefs.
Class one is made better off because their WTP for less crowded beaches ($154.14 for
medium, $258.14 for high) is significantly more than the $20 entrance fee for beaches. Class
two is made better off conditional on if a management scenario can be afforded for less
than $9.9 million annually and can offer some combination of benefits that are worth more
than the $100 entrance fee for the coral reef.
2.8 Conclusion
I have identified distinct subclasses of the visitors to Puerto Rico and their WTP. This
allows for more targeted increases in the prices of goods and services, which can capture a
greater percentage of the total consumer surplus, thus increasing total revenue generated
for management policies. This use of latent class analysis can be extended broadly to other
stated preference surveys. The ability to identify heterogeneous subclasses within a stated
preference population will allow for more actionable Pareto efficient non-market valuation
studies.
A logical next step would be to examine the benefits of specific policy plans such as
bag limits, beach clean ups, education, coral gardening, etc. Examining these management
strategies would help determine how the revenue generated should be allocated as well as
further justify the need for coral reef management and protection.
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2.9 Appendix
Table 2.9: Latent Class Model: Two Subclasses (No Class Membership)
Class One Class Two
Variable Coefficient WTP Coefficient WTP
Price1000 -17.34*** -3.37***
High Water Cleanliness .929*** 53.58*** 1.26*** 373.89***
Medium Stony Coral 1.36** 78.43** .116 34.42
High Stony Coral 1.12** 64.59** .374*** 110.98***
Medium Soft Coral .089 5.13 .416*** 123.44***
High Soft Coral -.625 -36.04 .463*** 137.39***
Medium Consumptive Fish .166 9.57 .196 58.16
High Consumptive Fish .674* 38.87* .403*** 119.58***
Medium Ornamental Fish .368 21.22 .081 24.04
High Ornamental Fish .572 32.99 .432*** 128.19***
Medium Invertebrates .338 26.87 .389*** 115.43***
High Invertebrates -.210 -12.11 .454*** 134.72***
High Large Wildlife -.386 -22.26 .575*** 170.62***
High Sport Fish .296 17.07 1.3*** 385.76***
Medium Water Clarity -.535 -30.85 .572*** 169.73***
High Water Clarity .414 23.88 .581*** 172.40***
Medium Crowdedness .759** 43.77** .059 17.51
High Crowdedness 1.50*** 86.51*** .309* 91.69*
Class Membership .416 .584
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗P < 0.01,∗∗ P < 0.05,∗ P < 0.10
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Table 2.10: Latent Class Model: Three Subclasses
Variable Class One Class Two Class Three
High Water Cleanliness 1414.87*** 313.11*** 19.70
Medium Stony Coral -620.15** 31.09 157.91***
High Stony Coral -35.56 201.21* 55.97
Medium Soft Coral 811.42** -120.95 -19.39
High Soft Coral 574.89*** -120.95 26.11
Medium Consumptive Fish -164.33 -155.80 16.10
High Consumptive Fish -8.08 155.99 86.15*
Medium Ornamental Fish -339.98 184.25 -2.97
High Ornamental Fish 121.23 412.51*** -158.85***
Medium Invertebrates 206.90 122.08 70.83
High Invertebrates 628.23*** -188.96 90.21*
High Large Wildlife 1115.84*** -87.60 -51.75
High Sport Fish 139.55 153.35 206.22*
Medium Water Clarity 312.50 -531.46 250.31***
High Water Clarity 872.31*** -370.95 140.87**
Medium Crowdedness 87.28 -167.11* 110.85**
High Crowdedness -232.76 144.88 27.36
Class Membership .298 .217 .484
Membership Class One Class Two Class Three
Income Per Vacationer .018*** .001 0.000
Vacationer -11.63*** -11.36*** 0.000
Visiting Family -12.17*** -11.50*** 0.000
Business Trip -12.73*** -12.99 0.000
Business/Pleasure -11.60*** -11.81*** 0.000
Male .106 .438 0.000
Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino .357 .042 0.000
White .304 .390 0.000
Age -.072 -.081 0.000
Constant 10.62*** 10.42*** 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗P < 0.01,∗∗ P < 0.05,∗ P < 0.10
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Table 2.11: Puerto Rico Attribute Levels
Status Quo (Low) Medium High
Corals and Sponges Corals and Sponges Corals and Sponges
No stony corals, only soft corals
and sponges.
Up to 4 species of stony corals
covering 5 to 20% of hard-bottom
with 60 to 90% live coral tissue.
5 to 17 species of stony corals cov-
ering more than 20% and up to
100% of hard-bottom with over
90% to 100% live coral tissue.
Up to 4 species of soft corals for a
total of 14 to 25 square centime-
ters per square meter.
Up to 4 species of sponges for a
total of 7 to 15 square centimeters
per square meter
Up to 3 species of soft corals for a
total of 4 to 14 square centimeters
per square meter.
Up to 3 species of sponges for a
total of 2 to 7 square centimeters
per square meter.
1 species of soft corals for a total
of less than 4 square centimeters
per square meter.
1 species of sponges for a total of
less than 2 square centimeters per
square meter.
Fish and Wildlife Fish and Wildlife Fish and Wildlife
Up to two species of consumptive
fish for a total of 3 fish per square
meter with no fish of legal size to
keep.
3 to 6 species of consumptive fish
for a total of 10 fish per square
meter with up to 50% of legal size
to keep.
H: Up to 15 species of consumptive
fish for a total of 100 or more fish
per square meter with 75 to 100%
of legal size to keep.
Up to 3 species of tropi-
cal/ornamental fish with a
total of 3 fish per square meter.
4 to 10 species of tropi-
cal/ornamental fish with a
total of 10 fish per square meter.
25 to 30 species of tropi-
cal/ornamental fish for a total of




1 species of Macroinvertebrates
with 1 to 20 per square meter
(urchins).
2 or more species of Macroinverte-
brates (conch, lobster or urchins)
1 lobster, 1 conch, and 20 or more
urchins per square meter.
No opportunity to see large
wildlife (sharks, rays, turtles,
manatees, dolphins).
Opportunity to see large wildlife
(sharks, rays, turtles, manatees,
dolphins).
No opportunity to see or catch
Sport/Trophy fish (ladyfish, per-
mit, bonefish, tarpon, snook,
jacks).
Opportunity to catch or see
Sport/Trophy fish (ladyfish, per-
mit, bonefish, tarpon, snook,
jacks).
Water Conditions Water Conditions Water Conditions
Clarity/Visibility: Less than 10
feet.
Clarity/Visibility: 10 to 50 feet. Clarity/Visibility: Greater than
50 feet.
Cleanliness: Not healthy for
Swimming.
Cleanliness: Healthy for swim-
ming.
Depth of Reefs: Greater than 60
feet.
Depth of Reefs: 20 to 60 feet. Depth of Reef: Less than 20 feet.
Crowdedness: 21 or more people Crowdedness: 11 to 20 people Crowdedness: 0 to 10 people.
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Table 2.12: Puerto Rico Survey Stated Preference Question
Option A (Status Quo) Option B Option C
Corals and Sponges Corals and
Sponges Corals and Sponges No
stony corals, only soft corals and
sponges.
H: Up to 4 species of stony corals
covering 5 to 20% of hard-bottom
with 60 to 90% live coral tissue.
M: Up to 4 species of stony corals
covering 5 to 20% of hard-bottom
with 60 to 90% live coral tissue.
Up to 4 species of soft corals for a
total of 14 to 25 square centimeters
per square meter.
Up to 4 species of sponges for a to-
tal of 7 to 15 square centimeters per
square meter.
H: 1 species of soft corals for a total
of less than 4 square centimeters per
square meter.
1 species of sponges for a total of less
than 2 square centimeters per square
meter.
M: Up to 3 species of soft corals for
a total of 4 to 14 square centimeters
per square meter.
Up to 3 species of sponges for a to-
tal of 2 to 7 square centimeters per
square meter.
Fish and Wildlife Fish and Wildlife Fish and Wildlife
Up to two species of consumptive fish
for a total of 3 fish per square meter
with no fish of legal size to keep.
M: 3 to 6 species of consumptive fish
for a total of 10 fish per square meter
with up to 50% of legal size to keep.
L: Up to two species of consumptive
fish for a total of 3 fish per square me-
ter with no fish of legal size to keep.
Up to 3 species of tropi-
cal/ornamental fish with a total
of 3 fish per square meter.
H: 25 to 30 species of tropi-
cal/ornamental fish for a total of 20
to 100 or more fish per square meter.
L: Up to 3 species of tropi-
cal/ornamental fish with a total of 3
fish per square meter.
No Macroinvertebrates (conch, lob-
ster or urchins).
M: 1 species of Macroinvertebrates
with 1 to 20 per square meter
(urchins).
H: 2 or more species of Macroinver-
tebrates (conch, lobster or urchins)
1 lobster, 1 conch, and 20 or more
urchins per square meter.
No opportunity to see large wildlife
(sharks, rays, turtles, manatees, dol-
phins)
L: No opportunity to see large
wildlife (sharks, rays, turtles, man-
atees, dolphins).
L: No opportunity to see large
wildlife (sharks, rays, turtles, man-
atees, dolphins).
No opportunity to see or catch
Sport/Trophy fish (ladyfish, permit,
bonefish, tarpon, snook, jacks).
H: Opportunity to catch or see
Sport/Trophy fish (ladyfish, permit,
bonefish, tarpon, snook, jacks).
H: Opportunity to catch or see
Sport/Trophy fish (ladyfish, permit,
bonefish, tarpon, snook, jacks).
Water Conditions Water Conditions Water Conditions
Clarity/Visibility: Less than 10 feet. L: Clarity/Visibility: Less than 10
feet
H: Clarity/Visibility: Greater than
50 feet.
Cleanliness: Not healthy for swim-
ming.
H: Cleanliness: Healthy for swim-
ming.
L: Cleanliness: Not healthy for
swimming.
Depth of Reefs: Greater than 60 feet. L: Depth of Reefs: Greater than 60
feet.
L: Depth of Reefs: Greater than 60
feet.
Crowdedness: 21 or more people L: Crowdedness: 21 or more people L: Crowdedness: 21 or more people
$0 $1,000 $750
(Cost to your household per trip) (Cost to your household per trip) (Cost to your household per trip)
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Chapter 3
A Nested Approach to How Individuals Make
Decisions in Stated Preference Surveys
Abstract
In this paper I propose a novel strategy for uncertainty adjust willingness to pay (WTP)
in stated preference (SP) surveys. I use two datasets from the National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration (NOAA). These datasets were administered to visitors to the
Puerto Rican coral reefs and visitors to the Olympic Coast Marine Sanctuary. An ex post
polychotomous Likert scale question provides me the basis for incorporating respondents’
uncertainty. I propose a novel way of incorporating this uncertainty. I model a nested
decision and test my model’s fit versus previous model specifications. My Nested Uncer-
tainty Measure (NUM) improves model fit as measured by higher Krinsky and Robb (KR)
confidence intervals (CI), higher pseudo R-squared, and more correct predictions over other
models that incorporate uncertainty and those that do not.
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3.1 Introduction
Incorporating respondent uncertainty in SP WTP studies has gained significant traction in
the last 20 years. Li and Mattsson (1995) were among the first to incorporate uncertainty
in a SP WTP study. After each dichotomous SP question, each respondent was asked to
report their confidence on a scale from 1-10. This “follow-up” structure has since been
implemented by many researchers (Alberini et al. 2003, Blumenschein et al. 1998, Champ
et al. 1997, Ekstrand & Loomis 1998, Johannesson et al. 1998, Loomis & Ekstrand 1998,
Ready et al. 1995, Ready et al. 2001, Van Kooten et al. 2001, Wang 1997, Welsh & Poe
1998) either implementing the certainty level directly in the response or in a follow up
question.
I propose a novel method of incorporating uncertainty following a respondent’s behav-
ioral response. Existing measures of uncertainty do not spring from choice theoretic models
of consumer behavior under uncertainty (loomis & Ekstrand 1998).
My NUM incorporates uncertainty following the nested decision process noted in the
donation literature. Donations follow a two-tiered nested decision. In the first stage re-
spondents decide do I want to donate (yes or no). Then in the second stage, conditional
on the respondents deciding to donate, they choose how much (Dickert et al. 2011). My
NUM will incorporate uncertainty at each decision in this nested structure.
Respondent uncertainty can arise for many reasons. The first is uncertainty surrounding
potential future quality levels of an environmental resource. This requires individuals to
comprehend how the surveys’ choices translate to different quality levels and believe that
these quality levels are achievable. Individuals’ inability to understand what could be may
make attaching a price to any bundle of attributes difficult.
The second is individual cognitive biases. These could arise in various fashions includ-
ing: cognitive overload (Drolet & Frances 2004, Hensher et al 2005, Hensher 2006, Hensher
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et al. 2007, Rose et al. 2009), yea-sayers (Blarney et al. 1999, Blarney & Bennett 2001),
anchoring (Bateman et al. 2008), or strategic behavior (Arrow et al. 1993). Depending
on the number of choices the individual must decide between and the number of different
attribute levels, it is possible that individuals reduce their decision to some subset of the
information provided (cognitive overload). Yea-saying is the tendency by individuals to
give responses that make them look good. For example, a consumer may choose a more
expensive bundle of attributes because they want to appear more environmentally con-
scious. It is possible the individual’s inability to value the quality levels results in the
individual anchoring their decision to some other price. Gaming is if an individual believes
they understand how the survey will be implemented and attempts to play strategically.
For example, if an individual is not planning on returning to Puerto Rico they may over-
state their WTP because they feel protecting the coral reefs has an intrinsic value even if
they will not interact with them directly.
Third, the value of the non-market amenity is dependent on substitutes and comple-
ments making it difficult to forecast future values (Wang 1997).
Lastly, how an individual interprets a hypothetical price may differ from how an indi-
vidual interprets one in which money is exchanged (Ajzen et al. 2004, Champ & Bishop
2001, Loomis & Ekstrand 1998). This behavior, often call hypothetical bias, may influ-
ence an individuals’ choice. Hypothetical bias can however be mitigated by making the
payment vehicle consequential (Campos et al. 2007, Morrison 2000). For both the visitors
to Puerto Rico survey respondents and for the Olympic Coast Marine Sanctuary survey
respondents were told that the costs per trip would be paid by all residents and visitors to
Puerto Rico/Olympic Coast through increased prices of goods and services.
While many different approaches for incorporating uncertainty have been proposed,
little consensus on which approach is preferred has emerged. I will explore a novel ap-
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proach where I model a nested decision. My methodology of incorporating uncertainty
outperforms existing methodologies of incorporating uncertainty across two different model
specifications, ordered logit (OL) and maximum likelihood (ML) in terms of three different
goodness of fit measures commonly used in the literature, and across two datasets.
I will examine a probabilistic representation of uncertainty in non-market valuation.
This approach was first proposed by Li and Mattsson (1995). As supposed to traditional
markets, where if consumers choose to purchase a good or service we assume that their
WTP for that good or service is at least the price, for non-market valuation it is important
to explore the possibility that the respondent does not know their true reserve price.
My approach has similarities to Loomis and Ekstrand’s (1998) Symmetric Uncertainty
Measure (SUM) which devalues the choice as a function of the confidence level and puts
positive weights on the selections not chosen. For Loomis and Ekstrand’s (1998) SUM for
the dichotomous setup if the probabilistic representation of the follow up question is 70%,
the selection is devalued to Pri=.7. The probability of the choice not selected would be
1-Pri=.3. The WTP is then estimated directly by a maximum likelihood estimate.
Three different measures of goodness of fit have been used in the literature to compare
different approaches for incorporating uncertainty. These measures are number of correct
predictions (Shaikh et al. 2007), pseudo R-squared (Shaikh et al. 2007), and KR CI,
the ratio of the width of the 95% confidence intervals around the point estimate (Akter
et al. 2008, Broberg & Brannlud 2008, Ekstrand & Loomis 1998, Martinez−Espineira &
Lyssenko 2012).
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3.2 Past Model Specifications
3.2.1 Random Utility Model
Li and Mattsson (1995) implemented a random utility model (RUM). They devalued the
dependent variable by the probabilistic representation from their follow up question (1-10)
weighting. In their dichotomous setup the choice selected was devalued by the probability
(Pri) corresponding to the follow up question and the choice not selected was replace with
(1 − Pri). A random utility Tobit model was then run which was left censored at 0 and
right censored at 1.
Here, I have to adapt Li and Mattsson’s (1995) to a polychotomous (three choices)
setup with a five point Likert scale follow up question. I still devalue the choice selected
(Pri) and the choices not selected are replace with (
1−Pri




Pri For the choice selected
1−Pri
2 For the two choices not selected
3.2.2 Symmetric Uncertainty Measure
Loomis and Ekstrand (1998) modified Li and Mattsson (1995) SUM and estimated the
model directly following an ML procedure. Loomis and Ekstrand (1998) believed that the
SUM should not devalue the choice selected to less than Pri = .5, thus they devalued the
choice selected, but if the choice selected was Pri < .5 they only devalued it to Pri = .5.
Here, I still devalue the choice selected to Pri ≥ .5 and the choices not selected are
replace with 1−Pri2 . This structure will be labeled SUMLE.
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3.2.3 Asymmetric Uncertainty Measure
The Asymmetric Uncertainty Measure (ASUM) was first proposed by Champ et al. (1997)
and has since been modified by Ready et al. (2001). As suppose to the SUM the left
hand variable is not devalued by some probabilistic representation. Instead, the follow up
questions are used as a confidence threshold. If the respondent is not a high enough degree
of certain the selected choice is zeroed out. For Champ et al. (1997) the individual had to
choose a 10 in order to not have their observation zeroed out. Ready et al. (2001) relaxed
this assumption only zeroing out observations with a follow up certainty less than 8.
Here, I have made a slight adaptation to ASUM. I have a 1−5 Likert scale thus Champ
et al.’s (1997) ASUM will be has a threshold of 5, called ASUM(5). Ready et al.’s (2001)
ASUM will have a threshold of 4, called ASUM(4,5).
3.3 Nest Uncertainty Measure
My survey has a polychotomous setup, i.e. there are three choices total, and thus two
choices not selected. I model a nested decision process with the SUM. The nested model
assumes the respondent is choosing between not spending money (option A) or spending
money (options B and C). If the individual chose option A, I assume their uncertainty is
on their decision not to spend money. Thus, if A is selected the probability on A is Pri
and the probabilities on B and C are (1−Pri)2 . However, if the respondent chose B or C, I
assume the uncertainty was choosing between B and C. Thus, the one selected is Pri and




Pri For any selected choice probability for that choice
(1−Pri)
2 If A was selected probability for B and C
0 If B or C selected probability for A
1− Pri
If B is selected probability for C
If C is selected probability for B
3.4 Survey Methodology Puerto Rico Coral Reefs
The non-market valuation of visitors to Puerto Rico stated preference survey used in this
paper was an inter-agency project between the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and NOAA. Five different teams were developed to examine the recreational-tourism
effects of the Guanica Bay Watershed restorations.
In order to better serve the community and the Puerto Rican government, island-wide
meetings with government agencies, businesses, and non-government organizations (NGOs)
were conducted on what they wanted from the study. It was determined that the project
should be expanded from the Guanica Bay Watershed to the recreational-tourism effects
of island’s coral reef system as a whole.
The non-market economic values were approximated to support benefit-cost analysis of
different restorations strategies for the EPA (Leeworthy et al. 2018a). The Puerto Rican
community and the EPA wanted the capability to assess restoration and protection efforts
throughout the island’s coral reef ecosystems.1
1This section previously seen in Chapter 2 section Survey Methodology Puerto Rico Coral Reefs.
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3.4.1 Puerto Rico Coral Reefs Dataset
This is the same dataset as seen in chapter two. Please refer to chapter 2 sections 2.3-2.4.7
for additional information on survey methodology, demographics, price, and protesters.
3.4.2 Puerto Rico Likert Question for Uncertainty
After each SP scenario the follow up question is “how sure are you that the option you
chose as your most preferred of the three options is your most preferred”. The respondent
then chooses from a five point Likert scale ranging from not sure at all (1) to extremely
confident (5).
3.5 Survey Methodology Olympic Coast Marine Sanctuary
This survey represents joint work between the Office of National Marine Sanctuaries Con-
servation Science Division and the National Centers for Coastal Ocean Sciences. This
survey was administered online, by Point97, to vacationers to the Olympic Coast Marine
Sanctuary and the Washington State Outer Coast.
This surveys initial purposes included: identifying individuals’ preference for different
types of marine wildlife, creating an index to predict different individual’s non-market
value and preferences (dominant social paradigm versus new ecological paradigm), and
approximating individuals’ WTP for amenity improvements to the Olympic Coast Marine
Sanctuary.
Individuals were presented with two stated preference scenarios, each with three options
to choose from. The options consisted of one option with all low level attributes for a price
of $0 and two options with low, medium, and high level attributes each with a nonzero
price attached. These prices were determined in part through the focus groups and wide
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scale pretest, with an objective of being both reasonable and avoiding issues associated
with fat tails.2
3.5.1 Olympic Coast Marine Sanctuary Data
The Olympic Coast Marine Sanctuary dataset follows a similar setup to the Puerto Rican
coral reefs dataset. Each visitor to the Olympic Coast Marine Sanctuary is presented with
four stated preference questions. These questions have option A for $0 and options B and
C with a bundle of low, medium, and high attributes for a nonzero price. Options B and
C have different prices. The five point Likert scale follow up question is How sure are you
of the choice you chose?. A SAS program was run to insure orthogonal design.
This survey was administered in two waves. The first wave focused primarily on ac-
tivities undertaken during the respondent’s vacation. The second wave focused on the
non-market valuation and included all four SP questions. The second wave is used in this
paper to explore the NUM. The number of observation for the first wave was 3,017 and
the response rate was 100% and the second wave (follow-up) had 2,521 observations for
a response rate of 81%. However, only 42.24% of these respondents participated in any
outdoor activities so the eligible sample size fell to 1,065 respondents.
The attributes vary because the Puerto Rico survey focuses on coral reefs, whereas the
Olympic Coast survey focuses on a northern beach on the Pacific Ocean. The attribute
levels being valued here include less algae blooms, tidal pool life, water cleanliness, number
of large predators, amount of marine species, etc. These attributes all contain a low,
medium, and high level.
2A list of all attributes and the specific quality characteristics corresponding to each level of each
attribute is provided in the appendix Table 3.7. A sample stated preference question is provided in Table
3.8.
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3.5.2 Olympic Coast Focus Group Testing and Pre-test
Two focus group tests were run by 5 Circles. One urban focus group was conducted on
August 6, 2014 in Kirkland, WA, a suburb of Seattle. Eight people were recruited for this
group. The second suburban focus group was conducted in the more rural area of Ocean
Shores, WA on August 7, 2014. Nine people were selected for this group.
The focus groups helped identify that some respondents had mixed preferences for
certain attributes such as a beach crowding. Some attributes were desired, but only up
to some point, such as density of driftwood and density of birds. Respondents’ primary
concerns were water cleanliness, unobstructed views, and beach access.
The wide-scale pre-test lead to a shortening of the survey and prices $20, $40, $80,
$175, $350, and $700 being used for options B and C (the amenity improvements from
option A, the forecast 15-20 year “low levels”).
3.5.3 Olympic Coast Protesters
In stated preference modeling it is important to identify “Protesters”. Protesters are
respondents who reject the survey’s scenario. These individuals will not reveal their true
WTP and need to be removed from the sample population. In order to identify these
protesters a thorough analysis was run using four Likert-style questions ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree):
I. There was not enough information for me to make informed decisions about doing
more to protect and restore natural resources or expand and improve facilities and
services.
II. I was concerned the federal, state and local governments cannot effectively manage
the natural resources and facilities or provide the services.
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III. I should not have to pay more for maintaining or improving conditions.
IV. I do not believe the scenarios accurately represent the current or potential states of
the environment.
Leeworthy et al. (2014) incorporated the individual’s choice of options to see if they
selected the status quo for both responses. If either the status quo was chosen for both SP
questions or if the respondent chose 4 or 5 for all four of the Likert questions the individual
was labeled a protester. 113 protesters were identified and dropped.
3.5.4 Olympic Coast Likert Question for Uncertainty
After each SP scenario the follow up question is “How sure are you of the choice you just
made?”. The respondent then chooses from a five point Likert scale ranging from not sure
at all (1) to extremely sure (5).
3.6 Identification Strategy
Following a maximum likelihood (ML) procedure, I estimate the coefficients directly. I
have estimated the fractional logit ML model of the form:
Ynjt = α0 + αDnjt + β
PrPricenjt + εnjt
where n is the respondent number, j is the choice number, and t is the number of different
scenarios. ynjt is 1 if the respondent selected that choice for that scenario or 0 otherwise.
Dnjt is the vector of dummy variables representing the attribute levels for respondent n,
choice j, and scenario t. Pricenjt is the corresponding price for each option and α0 is the
constant.
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After the LM fractional logit model is run, respondents’ WTP for each attribute level





The attributes included in the summation determine the WTP I am calculating. Including
all medium level dummy variables measures WTP low to medium [m,M ], including all
high level dummy variables measures WTP low to high [h,H], and the difference between
these two WTP measures WTP medium to high [h,H]− [m,M ].
My motivation is to make comparisons between my NUM and existing approaches for
incorporating uncertainty. Unfortunately, I do not have an experimental counterfactual
to determine a target WTP measure, thus I need to compare models across criteria other
than WTP.
When faced with this issue, past researchers have used various measures of goodness of
fit. These measures commonly include pseudo R-squared, number of correct predictions,
and the ratio of the width of the 95% confidence intervals around the point estimate.
The CI are calculated following a KR (1986) model. KR’s CI calculates the Cholesky
decomposition (C) and randomly draw values from standard normal distribution to gen-
erate a vector x. These vectors (C, x) are interacted to calculate a WTP estimate. A
bootstrapping procedure is run 10,000 times and the top and bottom 2.5% of WTP esti-
mates are dropped to create a 95% confidence interval.
3.7 Puerto Rican Coral Reefs Results
My NUM outperforms other uncertainty measures for the fractional logit model (Table
3.3) for almost every measure of goodness of fit. The KR CI is smaller for low to medium
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WTP, and low to high WTP. It is narrowly edged out for M to H WTP by UNCER. My
NUM has a higher R-squared than other models, and predicts more observations correctly
than any model aside from the LOGIT model.
These results appear to be immune to model specification. When I change the model
from a fractional logit to an ordered logit (Table 3.5) following Akter et al. (2009) and
Shaikh et al. (2007) it still outperforms other measures with lower KR CI than any model
specification, and a higher pseudo R-squared than any model aside from LOGIT. It does
have fewer correctly predicted observations than SUM and SUMLE. However, I discount
this result because these models both naively predicted all negative outcomes.
The WTP measures are generally higher for the NUM. This is to be expected. Struc-
turally, the NUM puts more positive weight on options B and C. It is consistent with the
respondent’s decision making process my NUM is modeling. If respondents who chose the
zero cost status quo option are uncertain about whether to choose the zero cost option or
some nonzero amount then it is safe to assume their true WTP is greater than zero. This
assumption should put positive pressure on WTP and is expressed in the results by higher
WTP estimates.
The household visitors to Puerto Rico WTP for low to high level attribute improvements
is $819.71 for the standard logit model, $1,580.93 for the NUM under the fractured logit
model, and $3,093.19 for the NUM under the ordered logit model. Puerto Rico attracts
approximately 1,171,368 visitors who engage in some coral reef activities or approximately
352,822 households. Thus, aggregating the low to high WTP to the visitor to Puerto Rican
population the total non-market value rises from $289,211,722 to $557,786,884 which has
a significant impact on what restoration projects should be considered.
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3.8 Olympic Coast Marine Sanctuary Results
The Olympic Coast Marine Sanctuary results are largely consistent with the Puerto Rican
results. The NUM outperforms existing measures that incorporate uncertainty. The NUM
puts positive pressure on the WTP estimates when compared to other measures that do
and do not included uncertainty.
For the Olympic Coast Marine Sanctuary the NUM outperforms existing measures for
low to medium level KR CI, low to high level KR CI, and pseudo R2 for both models
and has more positive predictions for the fractional logit model. The near zero estimate
of medium to high level KR CI3 is likely driving a low KR CI interval for medium to high
level attributes. Once again, the best predictor of correct observations is the model that
naively predicts the negative outcome always, in this case SUM and SUMLE.
The WTP estimates are driven by the low to medium improvements of amenities. This
is consistent with the focus group testing that for some attributes individuals preference
increases at first, but eventually leveled off (sea birds and predators) or were heterogeneous
(crowdedness and tidal pool access).
3.9 Conclusion
While my NUM has better goodness of fit over existing uncertainty measures across model
specifications and datasets the positive pressure on WTP estimates may call for pause
among researchers who argue for hypothetical bias. Further research to reconcile my NUM
and proponent of hypothetical bias could include a survey design which explores if indi-
viduals’ decisions follow a nested process.
A simple setup would be to ask one group of survey respondents A or B, a second
3The Olympic Marine Coast Sanctuary estimates are rounded to the nearest $10 by the software used
to calculate KR CI.
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group A or C, and a third group A, B, or C (where these are the same A, B, and C across
groups). If the decision is nested, the likelihood of choosing A for groups one, two, and
three should all be very similar (stratified by the follow-up certainty question).
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Table 3.1: Fractional Logit Puerto Rico
VARIABLES LOGIT NUM UNCER SUM SUMLE
Price -1.870*** -1.122*** -1.794*** -1.035*** -1.065***
High Water Cleanliness 0.839*** 0.475*** 0.771*** 0.447*** 0.456***
Medium Stony Coral -0.187 0.179*** -0.128 -0.0531 -0.0658
High Stony Coral 0.0410 0.172*** 0.0542 0.0287 0.0203
Medium Soft Coral -.1100 0.0399 -0.164* -0.137** -0.147***
High Soft Coral 0.0028 0.120** -0.0453 -0.0565 -0.0605
Medium Consumptive Fish -0.0423 0.165*** -0.0537 0.000204 -0.0105
High Consumptive Fish 0.0380 0.187*** 0.0414 0.0466 0.0396
Medium Ornamental Fish 0.0274 0.108** -0.0145 -0.00178 -0.00491
High Ornamental Fish -0.0649 0.113** -0.0414 -0.0458 -0.0529
Medium Invertebrates 0.415*** 0.229*** 0.327*** 0.177*** 0.177***
High Invertebrates 0.233** 0.284*** 0.215** 0.160*** 0.149***
High Large Wildlife 0.175** 0.223*** 0.179** 0.146*** 0.136***
High Sport Fishers 0.4320 -0.0216 0.294 0.0407 0.0971
Medium Water Clarity 0.0632 0.110** 0.00826 -0.00667 -0.00791
High Water Clarity 0.1340 0.0704 0.0339 -0.00387 0.00904
Medium Crowdedness -0.1510 0.0760 -0.152* -0.0838 -0.0750
High Crowdedness -0.297*** 0.151*** -0.210** -0.112** -0.0984*
Constant -0.6988*** -1.156*** -1.176*** -0.650*** -0.635***
L to M WTP 8.18 808.29 -98.63 -101.59 -125.93
L to H WTP 819.71 1580.93 720.07 628.82 652.81
M to H WTP 811.52 772.64 818.70 730.41 778.74
Ci L to Mβ 50.39 0.42*** 3.96 4.02 3.21
Ci L to Hβ 0.96** 0.43*** 0.87*** 1.21** 1.12***
Ci M to Hβ 1.23*** 1.05*** 1.03*** 1.32** 1.20***
R-Squared 0.075 0.107 0.077 0.071 0.077
Positive Predicted 19.61 9.48 0 1.97 1.97
Negative Predicted 92.46 95.95 100 99.53 99.53
Total Predicted 68.17 67.13 66.67 67.01 67.01
β: Significance level when testing H0: WTP<= vs. H1: WTP>0
Robust standard errors in parentheses ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.2: Fractional Logit Olympic Coast
VARIABLES LOGIT NUM UNCER SUM SUMLE
Price -1.845*** -1.082*** -1.455*** -0.734*** -0.824***
Marine Mammals Medium 0.269*** 0.341*** 0.225*** 0.118*** 0.131***
Marine Mammals High 0.479*** 0.462*** 0.395*** 0.214*** 0.241***
Sea Birds Medium 0.0406 0.287*** 0.0850* 0.0280 0.0201
Sea Birds High 0.0257 0.290*** 0.0347 0.0388 0.0285
Predators Medium 0.487*** 0.378*** 0.394*** 0.198*** 0.223***
Predators High 0.175*** 0.301*** 0.172*** 0.0945*** 0.0962***
Tidal Pools Medium 0.0840 0.341*** 0.115** 0.0670** 0.0623**
Tidal Pools High -0.0625 0.248*** -0.00220 -0.0141 -0.0250
Tidal Pool Access Medium -0.0180 0.322*** 0.0323 0.0107 -0.000556
Tidal Pool Access High -0.274*** 0.237*** -0.165*** -0.106*** -0.130***
Clean Water Medium 0.276*** 0.359*** 0.244*** 0.101*** 0.114***
Clean Water High 0.490*** 0.456*** 0.440*** 0.230*** 0.246***
Shoreline Quality Medium 0.154*** 0.422*** 0.196*** 0.0997*** 0.0921***
Shoreline Quality High 0.307*** 0.270*** 0.263*** 0.0959*** 0.137***
Harmful Algae Blooms Medium 0.273*** 0.313*** 0.241*** 0.0951*** 0.119***
Harmful Algae Blooms High 0.494*** 0.383*** 0.409*** 0.200*** 0.234***
View/Uncrowded Medium 0.427*** 0.412*** 0.353*** 0.182*** 0.208***
View/Uncrowded High 0.836*** 0.525*** 0.654*** 0.326*** 0.378***
Constant -1.515*** -2.158*** -2.242*** -1.054*** -1.089***
L to M WTP 1,080 2,930 1,300 1,110 1,180
L to H WTP 1,340 2,930 1,510 1,470 1,470
M to H WTP 260 0 220 370 290
Ci L to Mβ .29*** .21*** .31*** .35*** .31***
Ci L to Hβ .26*** .20*** .29*** .32*** .29***
Ci M to Hβ 1.56*** 119.06 1.99** 1.39*** 1.57***
R-Squared .092 .345 .088 .078 .094
Positive Predicted 23.02 17.78 0 0 1.39
Negative Predicted 90.84 90.68 100 100 99.25
Total Predicted 68.23 66.37 66.67 66.67 66.63
β: Significance level when testing H0: WTP<= vs. H1: WTP>0
Robust standard errors in parentheses ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.3: Ordered Logit Puerto Rico
VARIABLES LOGIT NUMα UNCERα SUMα SUMLEα
Price -1.870*** -1.318*** -1.866*** -1.276*** -1.300***
High Water Cleanliness 0.839*** 0.711*** 0.795*** 0.557*** 0.569***
Medium Stony Coral -0.187* 0.510*** -0.1390 -0.0117 -.027
High Stony Coral 0.0410 0.436*** 0.0516 0.0136 .006
Medium Soft Coral -0.1100 0.317*** -0.185** -0.212*** -.238***
High Soft Coral 0.0028 0.423*** -0.0636 -0.0741 -.092
Medium Consumptive Fish -0.0423 0.404*** -0.0648 0.0558 .042
High Consumptive Fish 0.0380 0.400*** 0.0309 0.1050 .093
Medium Ornamental Fish 0.0274 0.344*** 0.0135 0.0071 .005
High Ornamental Fish -0.0649 0.329*** -0.0612 -0.1050 -.114
Medium Invertebrates 0.415*** 0.477*** 0.349*** 0.201** .191**
High Invertebrates 0.233** 0.608*** 0.239** 0.243*** .225***
High Large Wildlife 0.175** 0.381*** 0.193** 0.206*** .193***
High Sport Fishers 0.4320 0.0788 0.3210 -0.1500 -.072
Medium Water Clarity 0.0632 0.371*** 0.0278 -0.0289 -.034
High Water Clarity 0.1340 0.295*** 0.0785 -0.0448 -.031
Medium Crowdedness -0.1510 0.321*** -0.1420 -0.1060 -.088
High Crowdedness -0.297*** 0.415*** -0.225** -0.1280 -.109
Constant -0.6988*** — — — —
WTP L to M 8.18 2081.94 -75.29 -74.24 -114.62
WTP L to H 819.71 3093.17 728.40 488.01 513.84
WTP M to H 811.52 1011.23 803.70 562.25 628.46
Ci L to Mβ 50.39 0.36*** 6.24 7.72 4.97
Ci L to Hβ 0.96*** 0.37*** 1.07*** 2.08** 1.92**
Ci M to Hβ 1.23*** 1.02*** 1.16*** 2.09** 1.83**
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0606 0.0569 0.0370 0.0159 0.0185
Positive Predicted 19.61 33.16 80.46 0 0
Negative Predicted 92.46 66.58 7.25 100 100
Total Predicted 68.17 55.44 31.66 66.67 66.67
α: No cut points reported for Ordered Logit
β: Significance level when testing H0: WTP<= vs. H1: WTP>0
Robust standard errors in parentheses ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
104
Table 3.4: Ordered Logit Olympic Coast
VARIABLES LOGIT NUMα UNCERα SUMα SUMLEα
Price -1.845*** -0.217*** -0.248*** -0.168*** -0.189***
Marine Mammals Medium 0.269*** 0.0636*** 0.0375*** 0.0266*** 0.0300***
Marine Mammals High 0.479*** 0.0880*** 0.0670*** 0.0488*** 0.0550***
Sea Birds Medium 0.0406 0.0489*** 0.00435 0.00455 0.00232
Sea Birds High 0.0257 0.0511*** 0.00382 0.00837 0.00604
Predators Medium 0.487*** 0.0729*** 0.0646*** 0.0447*** 0.0505***
Predators High 0.175*** 0.0561*** 0.0242*** 0.0208*** 0.0210***
Tidal Pool Medium 0.0840 0.0614*** 0.0140* 0.0143** 0.0130**
Tidal Pool High -0.0625 0.0398*** -0.00767 -0.00464 -0.00740
Tidal Pool Access Medium -0.0180 0.0549*** -0.00316 0.000757 -0.00212
Tidal Pool Access High -0.274*** 0.0353*** -0.0407*** -0.0265*** -0.0326***
Clean Watter Medium 0.276*** 0.0635*** 0.0371*** 0.0223*** 0.0251***
Clean Water High 0.490*** 0.0869*** 0.0730*** 0.0521*** 0.0558***
Shoreline Quality Medium 0.154*** 0.0763*** 0.0208*** 0.0206*** 0.0184***
Shoreline Quality High 0.307*** 0.0458*** 0.0331*** 0.0198*** 0.0290***
Harmful Algae Medium 0.273*** 0.0573*** 0.0338*** 0.0205*** 0.0257***
Harmful Algae High 0.494*** 0.0725*** 0.0673*** 0.0453*** 0.0531***
View/Uncrowded Medium 0.427*** 0.0780*** 0.0596*** 0.0415*** 0.0476***
View/Uncrowded High 0.836*** 0.102*** 0.110*** 0.0743*** 0.0862***
Constant -1.515*** – – – –
WTP L to M 1,080 3,010 1,180 1,110 1,090
WTP L to H 1,340 3,000 1,420 1,360 1,410
WTP M to H 260 -10 230 250 320
Ci L to Mβ .29*** .21*** .34*** .38*** .36***
Ci L to Hβ .27*** .20*** .31*** .35*** .32***
Ci M to Hβ 1.56*** 38.00 1.79** 2.02** 1.44***
Pseudo R-Squared .0730 .1490 .0426 .0173 .0267
Positive Predicted 21.77 17.50 79.32 0 0
Negative Predicted 91.63 58.75 7.56 100 100
Total Predicted 68.34 45.00 31.48 66.67 66.67
α: No cut points reported for Ordered Logit
β: Significance level when testing H0: WTP<= vs. H1: WTP>0
Robust standard errors in parentheses ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.5: Tobit Puerto Rico
VARIABLES LOGIT NUM UNCER SUM SUMLE
Price -1.870*** -0.266*** -0.854*** -0.216*** -0.221***
High Water Cleanliness 0.839*** 0.133*** 0.369*** 0.0932*** 0.0946***
Medium Stony Coral -0.187* 0.0741*** -0.0872** -0.0105 -0.0134
High Stony Coral 0.0410 0.0680*** 0.0151 0.00744 0.00543
Medium Soft Coral -0.1100 0.0428*** -0.0523 -0.0302** -0.0324***
High Soft Coral 0.0028 0.0617*** -0.0117 -0.0149 -0.0157
Medium Consumptive Fish -0.0423 0.0633*** -0.0149 0.00342 0.00126
High Consumptive Fish 0.0380 0.0641*** 0.00628 0.0116 0.0100
Medium Ornamental Fish 0.0274 0.0516*** 0.00618 0.00298 0.00241
High Ornamental Fish -0.0649 0.0500*** -0.0250 -0.0111 -0.0127
Medium Invertebrates 0.415*** 0.0802*** 0.178*** 0.0381*** 0.0377***
High Invertebrates 0.233** 0.0991*** 0.119*** 0.0377*** 0.0355***
High Large Wildlife 0.175** 0.0678*** 0.0843** 0.0342*** 0.0319***
High Sport Fishers 0.4320 0.0110 0.147 0.0101 0.0218
Medium Water Clarity 0.0632 0.0553*** 0.0204 -0.000386 -0.000612
High Water Clarity 0.1340 0.0433*** 0.0414 0.00139 0.00424
Medium Crowdedness -0.1510 0.0445*** -0.0794* -0.0178 -0.0158
High Crowdedness -0.297*** 0.0617*** -0.118*** -0.0245** -0.0215*
Constant -0.6988 0.0697*** -0.259*** 0.343*** 0.346***
L to M WTP 8.18 1548.12 -34.22 -66.60 -94.31
M to H WTP 819.71 2480.08 734.64 671.90 694.89
L to H WTP 811.52 931.95 768.85 738.50 789.19
BIC 5080.37 4078.17 6300.57 1186.50 1195.15
AIC 4960.24 3951.71 6178.13 1060.05 1068.70
LL -2461.1 -1955.86 -3067.07 -510.02 -514.35
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0606 0.1648 0.0514 0.2245 0.2295
Robust standard errors in parentheses ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.6: Asymmetric Uncertainty Measure Puerto Rico
VARIABLES LOGIT ASUM(5) ASUM(4,5)
Price -1.870*** -2.200*** -2.033***
High Water Cleanliness 0.839*** 0.715*** 0.858***
Medium Stony Coral -0.187* 0.0107 -0.1280
High Stony Coral 0.0410 -0.0436 0.0860
Medium Soft Coral -0.1100 -0.439*** -0.290***
High Soft Coral 0.0028 -0.2530 -0.1490
Medium Consumptive Fish -0.0423 -0.2760 -0.0293
High Consumptive Fish 0.0380 -0.0630 0.1010
Medium Ornamental Fish 0.0274 -0.1920 -0.0399*
High Ornamental Fish -0.0649 -0.1360 -0.0199
Medium Invertebrates 0.415*** 0.0065 0.351***
High Invertebrates 0.233** 0.1240 0.224**
High Large Wildlife 0.175** 0.380** 0.197**
High Sport Fishers 0.4320 -0.2100 0.3680
Medium Water Clarity 0.0632 -0.0565 -0.0789
High Water Clarity 0.1340 -0.1300 -0.0467
Medium Crowdedness -0.1510 -0.1820 -0.0990
High Crowdedness -0.297*** -0.0248 -0.0525
WTP L to M 8.18 -512.86 -154.50
WTP L to H 819.71 163 770.24
WTP M to H 811.52 675.86 924.74
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0606 0.0550 0.0598
Positive Predicted 19.61 0 99.04
Negative Predicted 92.46 100 4.78
Total Predicted 68.17 89.99 76.02
Robust standard errors in parentheses ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p <
0.1
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Table 3.7: Olympic Coast Attribute Levels
Attributes Status Quo (Low) Medium High
Marine Mammals: Number
of different kinds (diversity)
and Abundance (healthy,
sustainable populations)
L: Currently 29 species; 8 en-
dangered or threatened; 11 on
list of species of concern; Ex-
pect future loss in number of
species. Rare species never
seen. Populations affected
by human disturbances to the
point of declining and unsus-
tainable populations.
M: No Increase in threatened
and endangered species or loss
of species. Rare species occa-
sionally seen. Human distur-
bances reduced with half of the
populations of all species with
stable and sustainable popula-
tions.
H: A decrease in number of
threatened and endangered and
all 11 species removed from
species of concern. Rare species
become less rare and more com-
monly seen. Human distur-
bances reduced to the point
with all species with sustainable
populations.
Seabirds: Number of dif-
ferent kinds (diversity) and
Abundance (healthy, sus-
tainable populations).
L: Currently 19 species nest
here and many more migrate
through the area: 5 endangered
or threatened; 9 on list of con-
cern; Expect future loss in num-
ber of species. Populations af-
fected by human disturbances
to the point of declining and un-
sustainable populations.
M: No increase in threatened
and endangered species or loss
of species. Rare species occa-
sionally seen. Human distur-
bances reduced with half of the
populations of all species with
stable and sustainable popula-
tions.
H: A decrease in the number
of threatened and endangered
species and no species on list of
concern. Rare species become
less rare and more commonly
seen. Human disturbances re-
duced to the point with all
species with sustainable popu-
lations.
Opportunity to see large
predators such as killer
whales, sharks, etc.
L: Never seen. M: Occasionally seen. H: Commonly seen.
Tide Pool Organisms:




L: 10 to 20 species. Expect sig-
nificant loss of species. Rare
species never seen. Invasive
species common.
M: 20 to 40 species with no
expected loss of species. Rare
species are occasionally seen.
Invasive species reduced but are
occasionally seen.
H: Greater than 40 species.
Rare species become less rare
and more commonly seen. Inva-
sive species are rarely or never
seen.
Tide Pool Access L: Distance from access point
greater than 2 miles.
M: Distance from access point
is 0.25 to 2 miles.
H: Distance from access point
is 0.25 miles or less.
Clean water (no to low pol-
lutants) to support water-
based activities.
L: 27 to 40 beach closures for a
total of 216 to 323 days of clo-
sure. 11 to 15 beach advisories
with 83 to 124 beach days with
advisories. Conditions gener-
ally do not meet health stan-
dards.
M: 14 to 26 beach closures for a
total of 108 to 215 days of clo-
sure. 6 to 10 beach advisories
with 41 to 82 beach days with
advisories. Conditions mostly
meet health standards.
H: 0 to 13 beach closures for a
total of 0 to 107 days of closure.
0 to 5 beach advisories with 0 to
40 beach days with advisories.
All conditions meet health stan-
dards.
Beach and shoreline
quality (absence of de-
bris/garbage).
L: Large amounts of debris or
trash visible on the shore 3.25
lbs. per 100 feet of shoreline.
M: Moderate amounts of debris
or trash visible on the shore 1.6
lbs. per 100 feet of shoreline.
H: Minimal debris or trash visi-
ble on the shore 0.5 lbs. per 100
feet of shoreline.
Beach and shoreline qual-
ity (absence of harmful al-
gal blooms).
L: Numerous harmful algal
blooms causing respiratory dis-
tress to beach and shoreline
users. 0 to 15 beaches open for
razor clam digging per year.
M: A few harmful algal blooms
causing respiratory distress to
beach and shoreline users. 16 to
30 beaches open for razor clam
digging per year.
H: No harmful algal blooms
causing respiratory distress to
beach and shoreline users. 31 to
58 beaches open for razor clam
digging per year.
Views not obstructed by on-
shore or offshore develop-
ment.
L: Currently low development
with no obstructed views. Low
condition would be medium to
high development on land and
offshore development such as
wind or wave energy. Limited
or no access to beach or shore-
lines.
M: Limited to low intensity
development with views par-
tially obstructed by a few off-
shore structures. Some access
to beaches and shoreline.
H: Low impacts of develop-
ment with no offshore struc-
tures and easy access to beaches
and shores.
Uncrowded by other recre-
ational users.
L: 21 or more people encoun-
tered during a beach visit.
M: 11 to 20 people encountered
on a beach visit.
H: 0 to 10 people encountered
on a beach visit.
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Table 3.8: Olympic Coast Stated Preference Question Example
Attributes A: Status Quo Scenario B Scenario C
Marine Mammals: Number
of different kinds (diversity)
and Abundance (healthy,
sustainable populations)
L: Currently 29 species; 8 en-
dangered or threatened; 11 on
list of species of concern; Ex-
pect future loss in number of
species. Rare species never
seen. Populations affected
by human disturbances to the
point of declining and unsus-
tainable populations.
M: No increase in threatened
and endangered species or loss
of species. Rare species occa-
sionally seen. Human distur-
bances reduced with half of the
populations of all species with
stable and sustainable popula-
tions.
H: A decrease in number of
threatened and endangered and
all 11 species removed from
species of concern. Rare species
become less rare and more com-
monly seen. Human distur-
bances reduced to the point
with all species with sustainable
populations.
Seabirds: Number of dif-
ferent kinds (diversity) and
Abundance (healthy, sus-
tainable populations)
L: Currently 19 species nest
here and many more migrate
through the area;5 endangered
or threatened; 9 on list of
species of concern; Expect fu-
ture loss in number of species.
Populations affected by human
disturbances to the point of de-
clining and unsustainable pop-
ulations.
L: Currently 19 species nest
here and many more migrate
through the area;5 endangered
or threatened; 9 on list of
species of concern; Expect fu-
ture loss in number of species.
Populations affected by human
disturbances to the point of de-
clining and unsustainable pop-
ulations.
H: A decrease in the number
of threatened and endangered
species and no species on list of
concern. Rare species become
less rare and more commonly
seen. Human disturbances re-
duced to the point with all
species with sustainable popu-
lations.
Opportunity to see large
predators such as killer
whales, sharks, etc.
L: Never seen. L: Never seen. M: Occasionally seen.
Tide Pool Organisms:




L: 10 to 20 species. Expect sig-
nificant loss of species. Rare
species never seen. Invasive
species common.
M: 20 to 40 species with no
expected loss of species. Rare
species are occasionally seen.
Invasive species reduced but are
occasionally seen.
L: 10 to 20 species. Expect sig-
nificant loss of species. Rare
species never seen. Invasive
species common.
Tide Pool Access L: Distance from access point
greater than 2 miles.
H: Distance form access point
is 0.25 miles or less.
L: Distance from access point
greater than 2 miles.
Clean water (no to low pol-
lutants) to support water-
based activities
L: 27 to 40 beach closures for a
total of 216 to 323 days of clo-
sure. 11 to 15 beach advisories
with 83 to 124 beach days with
advisories. Conditions gener-
ally do not meet health stan-
dards.
M: 14 to 26 beach closures for
a total of108 to 215 days of clo-
sure. 6 to 10 beach advisories
with 41 to 82 beach days with
advisories. Conditions mostly
meet health standards.
H: 0 to 13 beach closures for a
total of 0 to 107 days of closure.
0 to 5 beach advisories with 0 to
40 beach days with advisories.
All conditions meet health stan-
dards.
Beach and shoreline quality
(absence of debris/garbage)
L: Large amounts of debris or
trash visible on the shore 3.25
lbs. per 100 feet of shoreline.
L: Large amounts of debris or
trash visible on the shore 3.25
lbs. per 100 feet of shoreline.
H: Minimal debris or trash vis-
ible on the shore 0.5lbs per 100
feet of shoreline.
Beach and shoreline qual-
ity (absence of harmful al-
gal blooms)
L: Numerous harmful algal
blooms causing respiratory dis-
tress to beach and shoreline
users. 0 to 15 beaches open for
razor clam digging per year.
M: A few harmful algal blooms
causing respiratory distress to
beach and shoreline users. 16 to
30 beaches open for razor clam
digging per year.
L: Numerous harmful algal
blooms causing respiratory dis-
tress to beach and shoreline
users. 0 to 15 beaches open for
razor clam digging per year.
Views not obstructed by on-
shore or offshore develop-
ment
L: Currently low development
with no obstructed views. Low
condition would be medium to
high development on land and
offshore development such as
wind or wave energy. Limited
or no access to the beach or
shorelines.
H: Low impact of develop-
ment with no offshore struc-
tures and easy access to beaches
and shores.
M: Limited to low intensity
development with views par-
tially obstructed by a few off-
shore structures. Some access
to beaches and shoreline.
Uncrowded by other recre-
ational users
L: 21 or more people encoun-
tered during a beach visit.
H: 0 to 10 people encountered
on a beach visit.
M: 11 to 20 people encountered
on a beach visit.
Cost to your household per
year
$0 $80 $40
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